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THE IMPLICATIONS OF POST-PHASE 1 AND "OFF-LABEL"
TREATMENT USE OF EXPERIMENTAL DRUGS: HOW EXPANSIVE
SHOULD EXPANDED ACCESS BE?
Patricia J. Zettler*
In 1999, nineteen-year-old Abigail Burroughs was diagnosed with cancer
of the head and neck.' Abigail underwent radiation and chemotherapy, but
these conventional treatments were unsuccessful. 2  Her oncologist informed
Abigail and her family of two experimental drugs, gefitinib and cetuximab,
that were beginning Phase 2 clinical trials in the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) approval process. 3  The oncologist believed these
experimental drugs might be an effective treatment option for her because the
drugs were designed to target epidermal growth factor receptors, which were
highly expressed in her tumor.4 Abigail's family sought to enroll her in the
Phase 2 clinical trials, but she was unable to participate in the trials because
she did not meet the inclusion criteria for the clinical trials of either drug.
5
Abigail and her family then unsuccessfully sought access to these drugs
outside of the clinical trials through the FDA's expanded access programs,
even though the drugs were being studied only for use in colon cancer, not
head and neck cancer.
Approximately two years after Abigail's diagnosis, and seven months
after Abigail and her family began their quest to obtain these experimental
drugs, Abigail died at twenty-one years of age.6  Following her death, her
father, Frank Burroughs, founded the non-profit advocacy organization,
* J.D. Candidate 2009, Stanford Law School. I would like to thank Professor Hank Greely
for his insightful comments and generous feedback on this Note. I am also grateful to my
brother, Jeffrey Zettler, for his suggestions and expert copy-editing.
1. Sue Kovach, The Abigail Alliance: Motivated by Tragic Circumstances, Families Battle
an Uncaring Bureaucracy, LIFE EXTENSION MAG., Sept. 2007, at 25, 26, available at
http://abigail-alliance.org/LEMSEP07pAbigailLR.pdf. See Peter D. Jacobson & Wendy E.
Parmet, A New Era of Unapproved Drugs: The Case of Abigail Alliance v. Von Eschenbach, 297
J. AM. MED. ASs'N 205, 205 (2007). Specifically, Abigail was diagnosed with squamous cell
carcinoma. Although often treatable, squamous cell carcinoma is life threatening when the cancer
metastasizes, spreading to organs and other locations in the body. See, e.g., The Skin Cancer
Foundation, Squamous Cell Carcinoma, http://www.skincancer.org/skin-cancer/squamous-cell-
carcinoma.html (last visited Nov. 27, 2008).
2. Jacobson & Parmet, supra note 1, at 205; Kovach, supra note 1, at 26.
3. Jacobson & Parmet, supra note 1, at 205; Kovach, supra note 1, at 26.
4. Susan Okie, Access Before Approval - A Right to Take Experimental Drugs?, 355 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 437, 438 (2006). See also Jacobson & Parmet, supra note 1, at 205.
5. Jacobson & Parmet, supra note 1, at 205.
6. See Kovach, supra note I, at 26.
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Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs (Abigail Alliance),
to create greater access to experimental drugs for terminally ill patients.7 To
achieve this goal, Abigail Alliance filed a Citizen Petition with the FDA and
then filed a lawsuit against the FDA in 2003.8
Abigail Alliance is not the only organization that has tried to expand
terminally ill patients' access to investigational drugs. Cancer patients first
lobbied for expanded access in the 1970s. In the 1980s and 1990s, HIV/AIDS
patients successfully fought for regulations that formalized expanded access
programs.9 Each of these challenges to the restrictions on access imposed by
the FDA approval process raised legal, ethical, and policy questions regarding
the FDA approval process and terminally ill patients' right to access
investigational drugs. The Abigail Alliance case, however, posed new
questions. Abigail Burroughs sought drugs earlier in the clinical trials process
(after only Phase 1 trials were completed) and sought drugs that were going
through the approval process for a condition she did not have (colon cancer).
This Note evaluates the issues raised by expanded access to post-Phase 1
drugs and to drugs intended for a different condition than the patients'
particular disease (off-label access), and it concludes that such access may not
strike the appropriate balance between safety and early availability of effective
treatments for terminal illnesses. Part I of this Note provides an overview of
the current process by which the FDA regulates the safety and effectiveness of
drugs. 10  In Part II, this Note examines the history of expanded access
programs, the current options, and the operation of those options. Part Ill
discusses Abigail Alliance's lawsuit against the FDA and concludes the D.C.
Circuit appropriately held that terminally ill patients do not have a
constitutional right to access investigational drugs and the courts may not be
the appropriate venue for making policy determinations about expanded
access. In Part IV, the Note examines the policy proposals of both Abigail
Alliance and the FDA to change the expanded access options. Part V analyzes
the policy implications of allowing post-Phase 1 and off-label access. The
Note concludes that the FDA's own policy proposal, which clarifies the current
system, strikes the best balance of the proposals and recommends that FDA
consider developing better methods for communicating with stakeholders
about expanded access programs.
7. Id.
8. Id. See Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. von Eschenbach,
495 F.3d 695, 699-700 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (en banc), cert. denied 128 S. Ct. 1069 (2008).
9. See, e.g., PHILIP J. HILTS, PROTECTING AMERICA'S HEALTH: THE FDA, BUSINESS, AND
ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF REGULATION 161-65 (2003) (describing cancer patients' advocacy);
Okie, supra note 4, at 438 (providing a timeline of access rights); Jerome Groopman, The Right to
a Trial: Should Dying Patients Have Access to Experimental Drugs?, THE NEW YORKER, Dec.
18, 2006, at 40, 43 (describing HIV/AIDS patients' advocacy). In the 1980s, there was even a
made-for-TV movie about a father's attempt to obtain an experimental drug to treat his daughter's
severe epilepsy. See John Corry, Fight for Life on ABC, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 1987, at C 18.
10. Although the FDA regulates products other than drugs, such as food, biologics, and
medical devices, this Note will focus only on the drug approval process.
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I. OVERVIEW OF DRUG REGULATION
A. The History of Drug Regulation
Before a drug can be marketed and distributed in the United States, it
must receive approval from the FDA. Modem drug regulation began in the
early twentieth century and has evolved over the past one hundred years. In
1906, Congress passed the Pure Food and Drugs Act. The Act required
accurate labeling of drugs but did not regulate the safety or effectiveness of
those drugs. 1 In 1938, following the death of 107 people who ingested the
liquid form of sulfanilamide,"2 Congress enacted the Federal Food, Drug and
Cosmetic Act (FDCA). 13 For the first time, the FDCA required pharmaceutical
companies to prove the safety of their drugs to the FDA before marketing those
drugs. 14 Although the FDA began to develop standards for demonstrating both
the safety and effectiveness of specific drugs,1 5 the FDA did not have formal
standards for assessing the effectiveness of all new drugs for the next two and
one-half decades.1 6 Pharmaceutical companies routinely tested investigational
drugs by simply sending them to physicians to give to their patients. 17
The current form of stricter FDA drug regulation began in 196218 after a
narrowly averted disaster related to thalidomide - a drug approved outside the
U.S. for use as a sedative and to ease nausea during pregnancy.1 9 A company
wanting to market thalidomide in the U.S. distributed 2.5 million tablets of the
drug to 1,267 physicians, who then gave the drug to approximately 20,000
patients for experimental use.20 Even though the company followed the
standard testing procedure of the time, Dr. Frances Kelsey, one of the
physician drug reviewers at the FDA, refused to approve thalidomide for use in
11. See Paul M. Wax, Elixirs, Diluents, and the Passage of the 1938 Federal Food, Drug
and Cosmetic Act, 122 ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED. 456, 458 (1995).
12. Sulfanilamide was a drug used to treat streptococcal infections (e.g., strep throat) and
was traditionally taken in pill or powder form. In response to customer demand for a liquid form,
the manufacturer discovered that the drug could be made into a sweet-tasting liquid by dissolving
it in diethylene glycol . Unfortunately, the manufacturer did not test the elixir for toxicity prior to
shipping. Diethylene glycol is typically used as antifreeze and can cause kidney failure if
ingested. See id; Carol Ballentine, U.S. Food & Drug Administration, Taste of Raspberries, Taste
of Death: The 1937 Elixir Sulfanamide Incident, FDA CONSUMER MAG., Jun. 1981, available at
http://www.fda.gov/oc/history/elixir.html.
13. Wax, supra note 11, at 459.
14. See id.
15. See U.S. Food & Drug Administration, Milestones in US. Food & Drug Law,
http://www.fda.gov/opacom/backgrounders/miles.html (last visited Nov. 3, 2008). For example,
in 1941, Congress passed the "Insulin Amendment," which required the FDA "to certify the
purity and potency" of insulin. Id. Similarly, in 1945, Congress passed the "Penicillin
Amendment," requiring the FDA to test the safety and effectiveness of all penicillin products, and
later all antibiotics. Id.
16. See HILTS, supra note 9, at 150-5 1.
17. Id. at 150; Groopman, supra note 9, at 42.
18. See HILTS, supra note 9, at 161-65.
19. Groopman, supra note 9, at 42.
20. HILTS, supra note 9, at 150-51.
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the United States without more rigorous clinical trials. 2' Thalidomide was
later found to cause severe birth defects, including deformed limbs, closed ear
canals, and malformed intestines, in the infants whose mothers took the drug.
22
Approximately forty cases of severe birth defects occurred in the United
States. 23 But if thalidomide had been approved for marketing in the U.S., an
estimated ten thousand infants would have suffered birth defects.2 4 In 1962,
after thalidomide's side effects were made public, Congress passed the
Kefauver-Harris amendments to the FDCA that gave the FDA greater power
and required pharmaceutical companies to demonstrate both the safety and
effectiveness of their products through "adequate and well-controlled
investigations" to obtain marketing approval.25
B. Phases of Clinical Trials
In the current approval process, a new drug is first studied in animals
during "preclinical" trials.26 If the drug shows promise in the preclinical trials,
the drug sponsor (usually a pharmaceutical company, academic research
center, or other research entity) submits an Investigational New Drug
Application (IND) to the FDA.27 The FDA reviews INDs for safety, scientific
quality of the proposed clinical trials, and plausibility of eventual approval.28
If the FDA approves an IND, clinical trials may begin. The
investigational drug must be studied in three sequential phases of clinical trials
before the FDA will approve an investigational drug for marketing and
distribution. 29  This clinical investigation is lengthy; a new drug typically
reaches the market seven to eight years after the start of clinical trials.
30
21. See id. at 152-65; Groopman, supra note 9, at 42.
22. Groopman, supra note 9, at 42.
23. HILTS, supra note 9, at 158.
24. Id. In Germany and several other European countries where thalidomide had been
approved, there were approximately 8,000 cases of severe birth defects and an estimated 5,000 to
7,000 in-utero fetal deaths due to thalidomide.
25. Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, § 102, 76 Stat. 780, 781. See also
HILTS, supra note 9 at 161-65 (explaining the impact of the thalidomide incident on Congress'
passing of the Amendments); Okie, supra note 4, at 438; Groopman, supra note 9, at 42.
26. U.S. Food and Drug Administration, The FDA's Drug Review Process: Ensuring Drugs
Are Safe and Effective, FDA CONSUMER MAG., Jul.-Aug. 2002, available at
http://www.fda.gov/fdac/features/2002/402_drug.html [hereinafter FDA 's Drug Review Process].
27. Id. (explaining that a drug must show promise in preclinical trials). See also 21 C.F.R.
§ 312.23 (2007) (describing the IND requirements).
28. 21 C.F.R. § 312.22(a) (2008).
29. See id. § 312.21; FDA's Drug Review Process, supra note 26.
30. Joseph A. DiMasi et al., The Price of Innovation: New Estimates of Drug Development
Costs, 22 J. HEALTH EcON., 151, 164-65 (2003) [hereinafter DiMasi et al, Price ofInnovation]
(7.5 years from start of clinical trials to approval), available at
http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/econ/dimasi2003.pdf; Joseph A. DiMasi, New Drug
Development in the United States from 1963 to 1999, 69 CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY &
THERAPEUTICS 286, 293 fig.7 (2001) [hereinafter DiMasi, New Drug Development] (7.2 years for
"priority" drugs, 8.1 years for "standard" drugs), available at
http://www.nature.com/clpt/joumal/v69/n5/pdf/clpt200137a.pdf.
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1. Phase 1
A Phase 1 study of an investigational drug involves twenty to eighty
human volunteers and is the first introduction of the drug into humans. 31 The
purpose of a Phase 1 study is "to determine the metabolism and pharmacologic
actions of the drug in humans, the side effects associated with increasing
doses, and, if possible, to gain early evidence on effectiveness," and to obtain
"sufficient information about the drug's pharmacokinetics and
pharmacological effects. .. to permit the design of well-controlled,
scientifically valid, Phase 2 studies."
32
For a typical drug, Phase 1 lasts a mean of 21.6 months. 33 At most,
twenty-two percent of the drugs that enter Phase 1 clinical trials are eventually
approved.34 This approval rate varies depending on the target illness. One
study found that approximately twenty percent of investigational drugs
intended to treat cardiovascular diseases that enter clinical trials are eventually
approved,, while only five percent of drugs intended to treat cancer are
eventually approved.35
Unlike Phase 2 and Phase 3 studies, most Phase 1 studies are conducted
with healthy volunteers. 36  In other words, Phase 1 research participants
typically do not have the condition that the investigational drug is intended to
treat. The FDA permits only investigational drugs that are both targeted to
life-threatening illnesses and likely to produce serious side effects to be studied
in persons with the indicated condition at the Phase I level.37
2. Phase 2
If Phase 1 studies indicate that the investigational drug is sufficiently safe
31. 21 C.F.R. § 312.21(a)(1) (2007).
32. Id.
33. DiMasi et al., Price of Innovation, supra note 30, at 165 tbl.3. But see Abigail Alliance
for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. von Eschenbach, 445 F.3d 470, 473 (D.C. Cir.
2006) (citing Alison R. McCabe, A Precarious Balancing Act: The Role of the FDA as Protector
of Public Health and Industry Wealth, 36 SUFFOLK U.L. REv. 787, 790 n.26 (2003)) (stating that
Phase 1 clinical trials only take one year to complete).
34. Joseph A. DiMasi, Risks in New Drug Development: Approval Success Rates for
Investigational Drugs, 69 CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY & THERAPEUTICS 297, 303 fig.7 (2001)
[hereinafter DiMasi, Risks]. This is one of the highest estimates of drug approval rates; the actual
percentage may be lower. See INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, THE FUTURE OF DRUG SAFETY:
PROMOTING AND PROTECTING THE HEALTH OF THE PUBLIC 37 (2007) [hereinafter FUTURE OF
DRUG SAFETY]; Ismail Kola & John Landis, Can the Pharmaceutical Industry Reduce Attrition
Rates?, 3 NATURE REV. DRUG DISCOVERY 711, 711 (2004) (finding that only eleven percent of
investigational drugs that enter clinical trials are eventually approved by the FDA or the European
regulatory bodies).
35. Kola & Landis, supra note 34, at 712.
36. Carol Rados, Inside Clinical Trials: Testing Medical Products in People, FDA
CONSUMER MAG., Sept.-Oct. 2003, available at
http://www.fda.gov/fdac/features/2003/503_trial.html.
37. Id.
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for further study, Phase 2 clinical trials of the drug are conducted.3 8 Phase 2
trials are conducted with a "small number" of human volunteers, usually "no
more than several hundred. '39 The purpose of a Phase 2 study is to "evaluate
the effectiveness of the drug for a particular indication or indications in
patients with the disease or condition under study and to determine the
common short-term side effects and risks associated with the drug."4 To this
end, Phase 2 trials usually have both a control and an intervention group.4'
Participants in the control group are given a placebo or the standard therapy for
their illness, while participants in the intervention group receive the
investigational drug.42 Participants are randomly assigned to either the control
or intervention groups and usually do not know to which group they have been
assigned. 43 Approximately thirty-three percent of the drugs entering Phase 2,
like the drugs Abigail Burroughs and her family sought to access, are
eventually approved.44 Phase 2 clinical trials last a mean of 25.7 months.
45
3. Phase 3
If Phase 2 trials demonstrate sufficient evidence of effectiveness and no
major safety concerns, Phase 3 trials begin.46  Phase 3 involves the largest
number of human subjects; the studies are conducted with several hundred to
several thousand human volunteers.4 7 Like Phase 2 trials, Phase 3 trials are
usually designed to have both a control and an intervention group.48 They "are
intended to gather the additional information about effectiveness and safety
that is needed to evaluate the overall benefit-risk relationship of the drug and to
provide an adequate basis for physician labeling., 49 Approximately seventy-
nine percent of drugs that enter Phase 3 clinical trials are eventually
approved.50 Phase 3 clinical trials last a mean of 30.5 months.
5
'
38. FDA's Drug Review Process, supra note 26 ("Phase 2 studies begin if Phase 1 studies
don't reveal unacceptable toxicity.").
39. 21 C.F.R. § 312.21(b) (2007).
40. Id.
41. See Rados, supra note 36.
42. See id. (In some cases, the control group receives the standard therapy, and the
intervention group receives the standard therapy plus the investigational drug.).
43. See id.
44. See DiMasi, Risks, supra note 34, at 303 fig.7.
45. DiMasi et al., Price of Innovation, supra note 30, at 165 fig.3.
46. 21 C.F.R. § 312.21(c) (2007); FDA's Drug Review Process, supra note 26.
47. 21 C.F.R. § 312.21(c) (2007).
48. See Rados, supra note 36. Phase 3 trials also often have several intervention groups that
each receive different amounts of the investigational drug so that dosing regimens can be
evaluated. The different dosing regimens are intended to provide the information needed for
"physician labeling." See 21 C.F.R. § 312.23(a)(6)(iii)(e) (requiring that INDs describe the
method for determining the appropriate dose); Linda Bren, The Advancement of Controlled
Clinical Trials, FDA CONSUMER MAG., Mar.-Apr. 2007, available at
http://www.fda.gov/fdac/features/2007/207_trials.html (explaining why the FDA requires dosing
investigation).
49. 21 C.F.R. § 312.21(c) (2007).
50. See DiMasi, Risks, supra note 34, at 303 fig.7.
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4. Post-Phase 3
If Phase 3 trials indicate that the investigational drug is safe and effective
for patients with the targeted illness, the sponsor submits a New Drug
Application (NDA) to the FDA.52 In many cases, the sponsor also agrees to
conduct post-marketing studies, called Phase 4 trials, so that the FDA can
collect additional data regarding the drug's safety, effectiveness, and optimal
use.5 3 Typically, a drug intended to treat a serious illness is approved about
one year after the NDA is submitted. 54 Approximately eighty-five percent of
NDAs are approved.55
C. "Off-Label" Use
"Off-label" use refers to any situation in which a patient uses an approved
drug in a way that differs from the instructions on the FDA-approved drug
label.56 The FDA approves drugs for the specific indications studied in the
clinical trials process and allows marketing for those purposes. 57 Accordingly,
the required label for the drug pertains only to that specific purpose. In other
words, off-label use occurs when a patient uses the drug for a condition or in a
manner that was not studied during the clinical trial process.
5 8
A physician may prescribe a drug for an off-label use, or a patient
independently may choose to use a drug in a manner different from the
instructions on the label (e.g., taking a higher dose of a drug than is
recommended on the label).5 9  This Note focuses on off-label prescriptions
because, although the FDA could theoretically prohibit patient-initiated off-
label use, 60 such a ban would be impracticable. Once a patient has a
prescription drug, monitoring the use of that drug is virtually impossible.
61
51. DiMasi et al., Price ofInnovation, supra note 30, at 165 fig.3.
52. See FDA's Drug Review Process, supra note 26. "When a proposed drug's benefits
outweigh known risks, [FDA] considers it safe enough to approve." U.S. Food & Drug
Administration, Frequently Asked Questions to CDER,
http://www.fda.gov/cder/about/faq/default.htm#9 (last visited Mar. 19, 2009).
53. See FDA's Drug Review Process, supra note 26.
54. Dimasi, New Drug Development, supra note 30, at 293 fig.7. The length of time
between NDA submission and approval is slightly longer for drugs that are not deemed a priority.
See id.
55. Id. at 294 fig.8.
56. See STEPHEN J. CECCOLI, PILL POLITICS: DRUGS AND THE FDA 157-58 (2004); David
C. Radley et al., Off-Label Prescribing Among Office-Based Physicians, 166 ARCHIVES
INTERNAL MED. 1021, 1021 (2006); Steven R. Salbu, Off-Label Use, Prescription, and
Marketing of FDA-Approved Drugs: An Assessment of Legislative and Regulatory Policy, 51
FLA. L. REV. 181, 186-88 (1999).
57. Salbu, supra note 56, at 186-87. The restrictions on off-label marketing have loosened
since the 1997 FDA Modernization Act; pharmaceutical manufacturers are now permitted to
disseminate to physicians peer-reviewed articles regarding off-label use of their drugs. See
CECCOLI, supra note 56, at 159.
58. Salbu, supra note 56, at 186-87.
59. Id. at 188-90.
60. Id. at 188-89.
61. Id.
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The FDA cannot prohibit off-label prescriptions because the scope of the
FDA's authority "extends to manufacturers of drugs but not to the physicians
who dispense them." 62  Off-label prescribing is common, although the
frequency differs among functional classes of drugs. 63  Some off-label
prescribing practices are scientifically justified and beneficial. 64 One off-label
success story is Prozac, which was originally approved as an appetite
suppressant, but has proven to be an effective anti-depressant.65 Fenfluramine
and phentermine, on the other hand, were both approved separately as weight
loss drugs but were sometimes prescribed in an off-label two-drug
combination, known as fen-phen.66  In combination, the two drugs caused
damage to heart valves, and both were eventually removed from the market.67
II. ACCESS TO INVESTIGATIONAL DRUGS OUTSIDE OF CLINICAL TRIALS
A. History ofAccess Litigation and Activism
For much of the FDA's history, no formal regulations granted terminally
ill patients access to investigational drugs outside of clinical trials.
68
Terminally ill patients were able to receive investigational drugs only through
an informal compassionate use exemption that the FDA granted on a case-by-
case basis. In order to get such an exemption, a patient's physician had to be
willing to request the exemption from the FDA, and the drug manufacturer had
to be willing to provide the drug to the patient free of charge.69 Terminally ill
patients' litigation and political activism led the FDA to create formal options
granting access to investigational drugs outside of clinical trials.
1. United States v. Rutherford
In 1975, cancer patients launched the first major attempt to gain access to
an unapproved drug outside of clinical trials by filing a class action lawsuit to
enjoin the FDA from interfering with the interstate sale and shipment of
laetrile, a drug not approved by the FDA. 7 0  The lead plaintiff, Glen L.
62. See id. at 190; see also CECCOLI, supra note 56, at 158 ("[T]he FDA does not regulate
the practice of medicine.").
63. See Radley, supra note 56, at 1025.
64. See CECCOLI, supra note 56, at 157-58; Radley, supra note 56, at 1025.
65. CECCOLI, supra note 56, at 158.
66. Id. at 159.
67. Id.
68. See, e.g., Expanded Access to Investigational Drugs for Treatment Use, 71 Fed. Reg.
75,147, 75,148 (proposed Dec 14, 2006) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. § 312).
69. See Michael D. Greenberg, AIDS, Experimental Drug Approval, and the FDA New
Drug Screening Process, 3 N.Y.U.J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 295, 315-18 (2000).
70. See United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 548 (1979). See also, Okie, supra note
4, at 438 (identifying Rutherford as the first major attempt at access outside of clinical trials for
the terminally ill). Laetrile is a compound found in some fruits, nuts and other plants. Some
believe it is an effective alternative treatment for cancer; however, clinical studies of laetrile in
humans and animals have shown little effectiveness in treating cancer, and it is not approved for
cancer treatment in the U.S. See, e.g., National Cancer Institute, Laetrile/Amygdalin,
http://www.cancer.gov/cancertopics/pdq/camlaetrile (last visited Nov. 5, 2008). Laetrile
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Rutherford, was diagnosed with colorectal cancer in 1971. Fearful of the
standard surgical treatment, Mr. Rutherford did not show up for his scheduled
operation; instead, he saw a physician in Mexico who gave him laetrile. Mr.
Rutherford believed that the laetrile cured his cancer and that he needed to
continue taking it to remain healthy.
71
The district court 72 held FDA regulation of laetrile was improper based on
a statutory grandfather provision prohibiting regulation of drugs on the market
before 1962. In the alternative, the district court held that the regulation
infringed on the constitutional right to privacy, which included the right to
determine one's own individual health care plan. 73 The Tenth Circuit did not
reach the statutory or the constitutional issues but upheld the district court's
decision because "the 'safety' and 'effectiveness' terms used in the [FDCA]
have no reasonable application to terminally ill cancer patients. 7
4
Relying on congressional intent, agency deference, and the plain language
of the FDCA, the Supreme Court reversed the Tenth Circuit's decision. 75 First,
the Supreme Court reasoned that when Congress passed the FDCA in 1938 and
the Kefauver-Harris amendments in 1962, Congress intended to protect
terminally ill patients from "fraudulent cures." 76 Second, the Court noted that
"[i]n implementing the statutory scheme, the FDA has never made exceptions
for drugs used by the terminally ill,"'7 7 and the FDA's longstanding
interpretation of the FDCA was "entitled to substantial deference. 78 Third,
the plain language of the FDCA contained no exceptions for drugs intended to
treat terminal illnesses. 79 The Court also found that ensuring drug safety and
effectiveness might be particularly important for those drugs intended to treat
presented a different situation than the Abigail Alliance case because it was not actually
undergoing clinical investigation. Rutherford, 442 U.S. at 550-51. The laetrile litigation is
relevant to the current questions of expanded access, however, because later courts cite to
Rutherford and because the litigation marked patients' first major attempt to circumvent the FDA
approval process.
71. See Rutherford v. United States, 399 F. Supp. 1208, 1210-12 (W.D. Okla. 1975).
72. The District Court's decision followed a remand to the FDA to determine whether
laetrile was in fact a "new drug." Rutherford v. United States, 542 F.2d 1137, 1143 (10th Cir.
1976) (remanding the case to the FDA to develop the record).
73. See Rutherford v. United States, 438 F. Supp. 1287, 1294, 1298-99, 1301 (W.D. Okla.
1977). Specifically, the District Court found that laetrile was exempt from the FDA's "test of
general recognition by experts as being both safe and effective for its claimed uses," id. at 1294,
because "[e]xtensive use of the substance, its commercial availability, and its recognition as being
safe, all previous to 1962, are well-documented in the record." Id. at 1296. Regarding the
constitutional right, the District Court held that laetrile was nontoxic, and denying cancer patients
the freedom to choose a nontoxic course of treatment, whether that treatment was effective or not,
infringed the patients' constitutional privacy interest and was not in furtherance of a compelling
state interest. Id. at 1298-99.
74. Rutherford v. United States, 582 F.2d 1234, 1236 (10th Cir. 1978).
75. See Rutherford, 442 U.S. at 552-53.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 553.
78. Id.
79. See id. at 555.
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life-threatening illnesses:
An otherwise harmless drug can be dangerous to any patient if it does not
produce its purported therapeutic effect. But if an individual suffering from a
potentially fatal disease rejects conventional therapy in favor of a drug with no
demonstrable curative properties, the consequences can be irreversible ....
Thus, as the Commissioner concluded, to exempt from the Act drugs with no
proved effectiveness in the treatment of cancer would lead to needless deaths
and suffering among ... patients characterized as terminal who could actually
be helped by legitimate therapy.
80
Thus, in Rutherford, the Supreme Court affirmed the FDA's power to
regulate new drugs intended to treat terminal illnesses and emphasized the
importance of marketing only safe and effective drugs to terminally ill patients.
On remand, the Tenth Circuit rejected the district court's finding that the FDA
regulation infringed on a constitutional right of privacy. 81  Following
Rutherford, several similar cases were litigated in federal and state courts with
the same result; the courts found no fundamental right for patients to access or
for sponsors to sell unapproved investigational drugs.
82
2. The HIV/AIDS epidemic
After Rutherford, the FDA did not promulgate any express rules for
granting terminally ill patients access to investigational drugs outside of
clinical trials 83 until the onset of the AIDS epidemic in the 1980s.84 In 1981,
the first reports of AIDS were published in medical literature. 85 By 1989, there
80. Id. at 556-57 (citations and internal quotations omitted).
81. See Rutherford v. United States, 616 F.2d 455, 457 (10th Cir. 1980).
82. See Carnohan v. United States, 616 F.2d 1120, 1122 (9th Cir.1980) (finding no
fundamental right to use laetrile, based on Rutherford); Cowan v. United States, 5 F.Supp.2d
1235, 1243 (N.D. Okla. 1998) (concluding that a person living with AIDS had no right to access
an unapproved treatment, particularly when the person had not applied for treatment use under the
FDA's expanded access programs); People v Privitera, 23 Cal.3d 697, 701 (Cal. 1979) (finding
no fundamental right to sell laetrile); Seely v. State, 132 Wash.2d 776, 792 (1997) (no
fundamental right to use marijuana as a medical treatment to counteract the effects of
chemotherapy). See also Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 28 (2005) (citing Rutherford, 442 U.S.
at 544) ("the dispensing of new drugs, even when doctors approve their use, must await federal
approval"); Alissa Puckett, Comment: The Proper Focus for FDA Regulations: Why the
Fundamental Right to Self-Preservation Should Allow Terminally Ill Patients with No Treatment
Options to Attempt to Save Their Lives, 60 SMU L. REv. 635, 645-51 (2007) (discussing all of
these cases in more depth). The D.C. Circuit panel's decision in Abigail Alliance, discussed in
Part IV, represents the only significant departure from these holdings. Abigail Alliance for Better
Access to Developmental Drugs v. von Eschenbach, 445 F.3d 470 (D.C. Cir. 2006), vacated en
banc, 495 F.3d 695 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
83. The FDA did, however, create an informal "personal use import exemption" that
allowed certain patients to import small quantities of unapproved drugs for their own individual
medical use. See Greenberg, supra note 69, at 316-17.
84. Groopman, supra note 9, at 42.
85. See DENNIS H. OSMOND, UNIV. OF CAL., SAN FRANCISCO HIV INSITE, HISTORY OF
THE AIDS EPIDEMIC IN THE UNITED STATES (2003), http://hivinsite.ucsf.edu/InSitepage=kb-01-
03#S IX (last visited Nov. 7, 2008) (describing the timeline of the early AIDS epidemic). See
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were over one hundred thousand reported cases of HIV/AIDS in the U.S. 86 and
only one approved treatment, AZT.87 In the context of the rapid spread of the
disease, the high mortality, the lack of effective treatment options, and the
social stigma associated with the disease, HIV/AIDS patients became
politically active in an attempt to force an unwilling presidential administration
to address their medical needs. 88 Faced with this political pressure, the FDA
created the treatment IND program in 1987.89 The program allows patients
ineligible for clinical trials to obtain investigational drugs that have completed
at least Phase 2 clinical trials.
90
B. Current Expanded Access Options
Since 1987, the FDA has created a variety of mechanisms to address
terminally ill patients' desire to gain treatment access to experimental drugs
during the clinical trial process.
91
1. Treatment IND Program
The treatment IND program was the first, and is the most widely known,
formal option for accessing investigation drugs outside of clinical trials. It
provides access for groups of terminally ill patients, rather than access for
single patients on a case-by-case basis. 92 The purpose of the treatment IND
also Centers for Disease Control, Pneumocystis Pneumonia - Los Angeles, 30 MORBIDITY &
MORTALITY WKLY REP. 250 (1981) (describing five men with AIDS in Los Angeles in June
1981); Centers for Disease Control, Kaposi's Sarcoma and Pneumocycstis Pneumonia Among
Homosexual Men - New York City and California, 30 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY REP.
305 (1981) (describing twenty-six men with AIDS in Los Angeles and New York in July 1981).
86. See Centers for Disease Control, HIV/AIDS SURVEILLANCE REP., Jan. 1990, at 1, 6,
available at http://www.cdc.gov/hiv/topics/surveillance/resources/reports/past.htm#surveillance
(providing number of AIDS cases); OSMOND, supra note 85 (indicating AZT was approved in
1987 and was the only effective treatment in the 1980s).
87. See HILTS, supra note 9, at 246.
88. Id. at 246-50.
89. See id. at 247; Groopman, supra note 9, at 42.
90. See 21 C.F.R. § 312.34(a) (2007); HILTS, supra note 9, at 247 (describing the context in
which the FDA created the treatment IND program). Patients could obtain the INDs either on a
case-by-case basis from their own physicians, or as part of a more general "expanded-access
program." HILTS, supra note 9, at 247.
91. See, e.g., U.S. National Library of Medicine, National Institutes of Health, FAQ:
ClinicalTrials.gov - What is an Expanded Access Protocol?,
http://www.nlm.nih.gov/services/ctexpaccess.html (last visited Nov. 28, 2008) (explaining that
persons who do not meet the criteria to enter into clinical trials may be eligible to receive an
experimental drug through an expanded access program.). The FDA also has expedited review
mechanisms in place to help accelerate the approval process for investigational drugs targeted to
terminal and serious illnesses. See 21 C.F.R. § 312.80. These programs are beyond the scope of
this paper because this paper focuses on access to unapproved investigational drugs, whereas
expedited approval programs focus on hastening the approval process and patients' access to
approved drugs.
92. See Meghan K. Talbott, Currents in Contemporary Ethics: The Implications of
Expanding Access to Unapproved Drugs, 35 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 316, 316 (2007).
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program is "to facilitate the availability of promising new drugs to desperately
ill patients as early in the drug development process as possible, before general





An investigational drug may be made available outside of clinical trials
only to treat either "serious" 94 or "immediately life-threatening" 95 diseases.
For serious illnesses, treatment use is usually permitted during Phase 3 clinical
trials "or after all clinical trials have been completed. '96 Only "in appropriate
circumstances" will treatment use for a serious disease be permitted during
Phase 2 trials.97 For an immediately life-threatening disease, "a drug may be
made available for treatment use under this section earlier than Phase 3 but
ordinarily not earlier than Phase 2. " 98 In practice, the FDA usually does not
allow post-Phase 1 access, the stage at which Abigail Burroughs requested
access, through the treatment program.
99
The regulation further stipulates that the FDA "shall permit" treatment
use of an investigational drug if three other specific criteria are met. 00 First,
there must be no "comparable or satisfactory alternative drug or therapy" to
treat the stage of the particular disease for which treatment use is sought.10 1
Second, the drug must be under investigation in a controlled clinical trial as
part of an IND application or it must have completed clinical trials.0 2 Finally,
the sponsor of the drug must be "actively pursuing marketing of the
investigational drug with due diligence."
' 10 3
Even if all of these criteria are met, the FDA may deny requests for
treatment use in certain circumstances. 0 4 For a serious disease, the FDA may
93. 21 C.F.R. § 312.34(a) (2008). See also 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb(c) (2007) (authorizing the
FDA to create the treatment program). In addition to authorizing the treatment program, 21
U.S.C. § 360bbb(c) authorizes the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services to
inform relevant health associations of expanded access programs, so that physicians and their
patients are aware of investigational drugs that might be used for treatment.
94. The regulation does not define what constitutes a "serious" disease. See 21 C.F.R. §§
312.3, 312.34.
95. An "immediately life-threatening" illness is "a stage of a disease in which there is a
reasonable likelihood that death will occur within a matter of months or in which premature death
is likely without early treatment." Id. § 312.34(b)(3)(ii).
96. Id. § 312.34(a).
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. See, e.g., Okie, supra note 4, at 439 (stating that drugs made available to patients
outside of clinical trials usually are in Phase 3 trials); U.S. Food and Drug Administration,
Expanded Access and Expedited Approval of New Therapies Related to HIVIAIDS,
http://www.fda.gov/oashi/aids/expanded.html (last visited Jan. 2, 2009) (explaining that for
HIV/AIDS drugs treatment INDs are usually granted "well into clinical trials, or when clinical
trials have been completed") [hereinafter Expanded Access].
100. 21 C.F.R. § 312.34(b)(1).
101. Id. § 312.34(b)(1)(ii).
102. Id. § 312.34(b)(1)(iii).
103. Id. § 312.34(b)(1)(iv).
104. Id. § 312.34(b)(2)-(3).
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deny a request "if there is insufficient evidence of safety and effectiveness to
support such use."' 0 5 For immediately life-threatening diseases, the FDA may
deny treatment use if:
... the available scientific evidence, taken as a whole, fails to
provide a reasonable basis for concluding that the drug: (A) May
be effective for its intended use in its intended patient population;
or (B) Would not expose the patients to whom the drug is to be
administered to an unreasonable and significant additional risk of
illness or injury. 106
Notably, the treatment use regulation does not address whether patients can
obtain off-label access to investigational drugs.10 7
Only the drug sponsor or a licensed practitioner, not a terminally ill
patient, may apply for treatment use.10 8 Licensed practitioners, moreover, may
apply only if the sponsor refuses to apply. 0 9 In most circumstances, these
restrictions on who may apply might be a formality. Sponsors and physicians
are likely to have the expertise to supply the FDA with the information
necessary to gain approval for treatment use, such as the rationale for using an
investigational drug for a particular group of patients.1 Patients learn about
drugs in the approval process in a variety of ways. Some patients may not be
aware of such drugs unless their physician informs them. Other patients might
learn independently of investigational drugs through advertisements for
clinical trials or advocacy groups."' Patient advocacy groups, such as Abigail
Alliance, might be knowledgeable about unapproved drugs in the pipeline and
the science behind their development. However, the FDA does not have the
authority to require a sponsor to provide treatment use. 1 2  Thus, even in
circumstances when a patient independently learns of an investigational drug,
the FDA restrictions on who may apply are not likely to be the obstacle for
patients.
Finally, sponsors are permitted to charge patients for treatment use of an
unapproved drug, provided:
(i) There is adequate enrollment in the ongoing clinical investigations
105. Id. § 312.34(b)(2).
106. Id. § 312.34(b)(3).
107. See id. § 312.34 (failing to address patient access to off-label drugs).
108. See id. § 312.35(a)-(b).
109. See id. § 312.35(b)(1).
110. See id. §312.35(a)(1)(ii).
111. See, e.g., Rados, supra note 36 (noting that patients often learn of clinical trials from
newspapers and the NIH clinical trials website).
112. See 21 C.F.R. § 312.34 (providing no authority to require that drug companies provide
treatment use); see also U.S. Food & Drug Administration, Center for Drug Evaluation and
Research, Oncology Tools, Access to Unapproved Drugs,
http://www.fda.gov/cder/cancer/access.htm (last visited Mar. 19, 2009) ("Treating a patient as an
exception [to the study protocol] is at the discretion of the investigator and sponsor... ").
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under the authorized ND; (ii) charging does not constitute commercial
marketing of a new drug for which a marketing application has not been
approved; (iii) the drug is not being commercially promoted or advertised; and
(iv) the sponsor of the drug is actively pursuing marketing approval with due
diligence.1
1 3
The sponsor must inform the FDA, in writing, of its plan to charge
patients prior to beginning its charging practice. 114 Sponsors may only charge
an amount "necessary to recover costs of manufacture, research, development,
and handling of the investigational drug."
' 15
2. Emergency Use
The emergency use provision allows a sponsor to ship an investigational
drug for a specified use when submission of a formal IND under 21 C.F.R. §
312.23 (general ND) or § 312.34 (treatment use) is not possible due to an
emergency situation." 6  The sponsor must request emergency use
authorization via "telephone or other rapid communication means." '117
Authorization almost always "will be conditioned on the sponsor making an
appropriate ND submission as soon as practicable after receiving the
authorization."1 8 Although the regulation does not give specific examples of
what types of situations rise to the level of "emergency,"" 9 elsewhere the FDA
states that this regulation "implicitly acknowledged" informal types of
expanded access, such as compassionate use for a single patient, that the FDA
has historically granted. 120 Unlike the treatment IND program, the emergency
use program does not specify criteria that a patient, investigational drug, or
situation must meet in order to qualify for emergency use. 12  The FDA does
not make information about how often the emergency use program is used
readily available to the public.
113. 21 C.F.R. § 312.7(d)(2).
114. Id.
115. Id. § 312.7(d)(3).
116. Id. § 312.36. See also 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb(a) (2007) (authorizing the FDA to allow
access to investigational drugs in emergency situations).
117. 21 C.F.R. § 312.36.
118. Id.
119. See id. Although the FDA has issued guidance regarding large-scale emergency
situations, such as public health or military crises, that guidance is not relevant to a discussion of
individual patients' access. See U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Guidance: Emergency Use
Authorization of Medical Products, http://www.fda.gov/oc/guidance/emergencyuse.html (last
visited Nov. 8, 2008).
120. Expanded Access to Investigational Drugs for Treatment Use, 71 Fed. Reg. 75,147,
75,148-49 (proposed Dec 14, 2006) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. § 312).
121. Compare 21 C.F.R. § 312.34 (outlining the criteria for an investigational drug to be
used for treatment use), and § 312.35 (listing protocol for treatment use), with 21 C.F.R. § 312.36
(failing to list any criteria for emergency use).
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3. Individual Use
The Food and Drug Modernization Act of 1997 created an access option
for individual patients.122 The statutory provision allows any person, acting
through a licensed physician, to request from a sponsor or manufacturer
individual access to an investigational drug for treatment of a serious
disease.' 23 Four conditions must be met before individual access is granted.
24
First, the physician must determine that no alternative to the investigational
drug exists for the patient and that the probable risk to the patient from using
the investigational drug is not greater than the risk due to the serious disease.
25
Second, "sufficient evidence of safety and effectiveness to support the use of
the investigational drug" must exist.126  Third, individual use of the
investigational drug must not interfere with the clinical investigation of the
drug.' 27 Finally, the sponsor must submit a protocol describing the use of the
investigational drug in a single patient or a small group of patients.' 28 Unlike
the treatment and emergency use programs, the personal use program is not
explained in a formal FDA regulation. Similar to the emergency use program,
it is not clear how often the individual use option is used.
4. Disease-Specific Access Programs
There are two disease-specific expanded access programs, one for
HIV/AIDS patients and one for cancer patients, that are similar to the treatment
IND program. In response to the HIV/AIDS epidemic, the Public Health
Service'29 developed the parallel track system for persons living with
HIV/AIDS.' 3 ° The parallel track system is "designed to expand the availability
of promising investigational agents and to make these agents more widely
available to people with AIDS and other HIV-related diseases who have no
therapeutic alternatives and who cannot participate in the controlled clinical
trials."'' To achieve this purpose, parallel track studies enroll patients
122. See 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb(b) (2007). See also Expanded Access to Investigational
Drugs for Treatment Use, 71 Fed. Reg. at 75,149 (explaining the history of the Food and Drug
Modernization Act).
123. See 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb(b).
124. Id.
125. Id. § 360bbb(b)(1)
126. Id. § 360bbb(b)(2).
127. Id. § 360bbb(b)(3).
128. Id. § 360bbb(b)(4).
129. The U.S. Public Health Service is a federal corps of public health professionals that
works to promote U.S. public health and advances in public health science. See U.S. Public
Health Service Commissioned Corps, http://www.usphs.gov/aboutus/questions.aspx#whatis (last
visited Jan. 2, 2009).
130. Expanded Availability of Investigational New Drugs Through a Parallel Track
Mechanism for People With AIDS and Other HIV-Related Disease, 57 Fed. Reg. 13,250 (Apr.
15, 1992). See also Peter M. Currie, Restricting Access to Unapproved Drugs: A Compelling
Government Interest?, 20 J.L. & HEALTH 309, 315 (2007); U.S. Food and Drug Administration,
Parallel Track, http://www.fda.gov/cder/handbook/parallel.htm (last visited Jan. 2, 2009).
131. Expanded Availability of Investigational New Drugs Through a Parallel Track
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ineligible for clinical trials, for example because they are too sick to meet the
inclusion criteria.' 32 The parallel studies do not have a control group and run
concurrently with traditional clinical trials.' 33  Sponsors must develop and
submit a protocol for parallel access in order for their investigational drug to be
studied in this system.1 34  The FDA approves or denies the protocol after
consulting with the National Institutes of Health AIDS Research Advisory
Committee.' 35  As of 2005, the clinical investigation of only one drug,
stavudine, had been conducted using the parallel track system.' 36
To provide expanded access to cancer patients, the "Group C" treatment
IND program was developed jointly by the FDA and the National Cancer
Institution (NCI). 13 7 Similar to the treatment IND program, this program is
intended to provide access to large groups of patients. Investigational drugs
used for Group C are usually undergoing or have completed Phase 3 clinical
trials and must have demonstrated "evidence of relative and reproducible
efficacy in a specific tumor type."' 38 The drugs are distributed by the National
Institutes of Health, under NCI protocols, to physicians who administer the
drugs to patients for treatment purposes.' 39
C. How Do U.S. Expanded Access Options Compare to Programs in Canada
and Europe?
Other developed nations address expanded access in a variety of ways,
while some do not address the issue at all. For example, Canada's "Special
Access Programme" closely parallels the U.S. individual use or emergency use
programs. 4° Canada allows seriously ill patients to access pre-market drugs
on a case-by-case basis.' 4' A patient's physician must request the drug for the
patient. The physician is responsible for ensuring that there is credible
evidence to support the use of the drug and that the patient is informed of the
Mechanism for People With AIDS and Other HIV-Related Disease, 57 Fed. Reg. at 12,350.
There are several reasons why a person would not be able to participate in a clinical trial, such as
not living near a location where the trial is taking place. Id. at 13,253.
132. Id. at 13.257.
133. See id. at 13,252-53.
134. See id. at 13,252.
135. See id.
136. Expanded Access, supra note 99. Although only stavudine has undergone clinical
investigation through the parallel track system, eleven other HIV/AIDS drugs have undergone
clinical investigation with a treatment IND program. See id.
137. Currie, supra note 129, at 314.
138. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARDS AND
CLINICAL INVESTIGATORS: 1998 UPDATE, DRUGS AND BIOLOGICS (1998),
http://www.fda.gov/oc/ohrt/irbs/drugsbiologics.html#treatment.
139. Id.
140. See Food & Drug Regulations, C.R.C. 08.010-011 (Can.); Health Canada, Drugs &
Health Products: Special Access Programme - Drugs, Nov. 22, 2002, http://www.hc-
sc.gc.ca/dhp-mps/acces/drugs-drogues/sapfs-pasfd_2002-e.html (last visited Jan. 2, 2009).
141. Health Canada, Drugs & Health Products: Special Access Programme - Drugs, Nov.
22, 2002, http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/dhp-mps/acces/drugs-drogues/sapfs-pasfd_2002_e.html (last
visited Jan. 2, 2009).
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risks and benefits. 142 Health Canada, the responsible department in the
Canadian government, makes "every effort" to review special access
applications within twenty-four hours, unlike the FDA, which does not specify
how quickly it will review applications. 143 Drug manufacturers "have the final
word" regarding the approval of the application and are permitted to put
restrictions on the special access use, including charging the patient for the
drug.144 Health Canada, unlike the FDA, is currently reviewing its Special
Access Programme to determine how well the program is functioning and
planning to publicly report its findings.'4 5
European Union member states administer their own expanded
programs, 146 and some member states do not have any expanded programs. 147
Although no unitary "European" expanded access program exists, the
European Union does advise member states regarding "compassionate use"
programs for large groups of patients. 148  For those member nations with
compassionate use programs, the European Union recommends that patients
receiving experimental drugs have a serious or life-threatening illness with no
other treatment options and that the drugs should be undergoing clinical
investigation. 149 Unlike the United States, the European Union recommends
that member states do not allow patients to receive experimental drugs for off-
label use.' 5 ' The European Union also has programs for "orphan" drugs,
which are intended to treat rare illnesses or are drugs for which manufacturers
otherwise need incentives to produce because of economic reasons.'
5
'
D. How Well Do the Current U.S. Expanded Access Options Work?
Since the inception of formal expanded access programs in the United
States, a large number of patients have gained access to investigational drugs




145. See Health Canada, Drugs & Health Products: Special Access Programme -
Comprehensive Review, http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/dhp-mps/acces/sap-pas-comp-e.html (last
visited Jan. 2, 2009) [hereinafter SAP - Comprehensive Review].
146. See EUROPEAN MEDS. AGENCY, THE EMEA's ROLE IN COMPASSIONATE USE 1 (Jul.
19, 2007), available at http://www.emea.europa.eu/pdfs/human/euleg/7214406enfin.pdf
[hereinafter EMEA, ROLE IN COMPASSIONATE USE].
147. For example, the U.K. has a program that allows patients to receive orphan drugs, but
does not have a general emergency or compassionate use program. See INTERNATIONAL
PHARMACEUTICAL LAW & PRACTICE § 18.04 (2007).
148. COMM. FOR MEDICINAL PROJECTS FOR HUMAN USE, EUROPEAN MEDS. AGENCY,
GUIDELINE ON COMPASSIONATE USE OF MEDICINAL PRODUCTS, PURSUANT TO ARTICLE 83 OF
REGULATION (EC) NO. 726/2004 3-4 (Jul. 19, 2007), available at




151. See European Medicines Agency, Human Medicines - Orphan Medicinal Products,
http://www.emea.europa.eu/htms/human/orphans/intro.htm (last visited Jan. 2, 2009).
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thousand patients have gained access to investigational drugs through its
expanded access programs. 152  Over 75,000 patients with HIV/AIDS have
received access to drugs through expanded access programs, 153 suggesting that
only approximately 25,000 patients with a condition other than HIV/AIDS
have received investigational drugs through expanded access programs.
Patients may perceive the number of current opportunities available for
expanded access to be limited because the existing options may not be
effectively communicated to patients. A search for "expanded access" on the
NIH clinical trials registry, ClinicalTrials.gov, indicates that as of February 1,
2009, there are 101 expanded access protocols, of which 47 are seeking more
volunteers, out of approximately 27,000 total clinical trials seeking more
volunteers.15 4 Even if only a small fraction of the approximately 27,000 listed
open clinical trials are eligible for expanded access programs, expanded access
opportunities for patients are more limited than the opportunities to participate
in clinical trials. The low number of expanded access trials resulting from the
search may be due in part to ineffective search tools on the website.155 For
example, if one uses the "advanced search" function on ClinicalTrials.gov and
selects "expanded access studies" as the study type, a search yields only 67
total trials.156 Similarly, a California pancreatic cancer organization used data-
mining techniques to find 435 trials accepting pancreatic cancer patients on
ClinicalTrials.gov, whereas a search for "pancreatic cancer" on the website
yielded only 98 trials. 1
57
It is not clear precisely how many applications for the expanded access
mechanisms the FDA denies for failing regulatory requirements or because a
sponsor declines to make its investigational drug available for expanded
access. The current head of the Office of Oncology Drug Products stated that,
in his first year and a half, the FDA had denied only one application for
expanded access and had done so only because the child patient's parents had
refused to give the child the standard treatment.1 58 However, if many patients,
152. Nellie Bristol, Should Terminally Ill Patients Have Access to Phase I Drugs?, 369
LANCET 815, 815 (2007). See also U.S. Food and Drug Administration, FDA Proposes Rules
Overhaul to Expand Availability of Experimental Drugs, Dec. 11, 2005,
http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/NEWS/2006/NEW0I520.html (last visited Jan. 2, 2009) (reporting
that since the 1970s "tens of thousands" of patients with HIV/AIDS, cancer, and cardiovascular
diseases have used expanded access options).
153. Expanded Access, supra note 99.
154. See U.S. National Institutes of Health, ClinicalTrials.gov,
http://www.clinicaltrials.gov/ (last visited Feb. 1, 2009) [hereinafter ClinicalTrials.gov].
ClinicalTrials.gov indicates that it has a total of 67,791 trials listed; by selecting the advanced
search function, and limiting the search to trials with open recruitment, a list of approximately
27,000 trials is produced. See id.
155. See Meredith Wadman, Verdict on Clinical Trials Registries? Good, But Must Do
Better, 5 NATURE REV. DRUG DISCOVERY 175, 176 (2006).
156. See ClinicalTrials.gov, sujlra note 152.
157. Wadman, supra note 153, at 176.
158. Groopman, supra note 9, at 45. See also U.S. Food and Drug Administration, FDA
Names Dr. Richard Pazdur to Lead New Cancer Office, Apr. 22, 2005,
http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/news/2005/NEW01175.html (last visited Jan. 3, 2009) (indicating
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like Abigail Burroughs, are requesting access to investigational drugs that are
just beginning Phase 2 clinical trials, the FDA is likely turning down more
applications for expanded access than this FDA official's experience might
suggest.
159
Similarly, it is difficult to determine precisely how many of the
investigational drugs to which patients do gain treatment access are later found
to be safe and effective. Only 33% of the investigational drugs that Abigail
Alliance is seeking to access - the drugs that complete Phase 1 and are
beginning Phase 2 clinical trials - are eventually approved. 160 Moreover, a
majority of drugs that fail to reach the market do so because of problems with
safety or effectiveness. Of all of the drugs that drop out of the approval
process, 37.6% are withdrawn due to insufficient effectiveness, 19.6% are
withdrawn due to safety concerns, 33.8% are withdrawn due to economic
considerations, such as a commercial market that is too small, and 9.0% are
withdrawn due to other problems. 16 1 Conversely, patients and access advocacy
groups may argue that patients, especially those notified of a particular
investigational drug by their doctor, are seeking access to especially promising
drugs that are more likely to be among those destined for approval.
162
Without more comprehensive data, it is unknown how many patients
currently are being treated with investigational drugs through expanded access,
how many patients want to be treated with investigational drugs but are denied
access by the FDA, how often sponsors refuse to participate in expanded
access options, and whether patients who do gain access are being treated with
drugs that are eventually found to be safe and effective. The FDA does not
make this data readily available to the general public, and patient advocacy
groups, like Abigail Alliance, have not yet pushed the FDA to publish such
that Dr. Pazdur had been in his position at the FDA approximate one and one-half years at the
time he was quoted in the NEW YORKER); Okie, supra note 4, at 440 (quoting the FDA's deputy
commissioner as saying "the agency has generally been aggressive in granting [expanded
access]").
159. See 21 C.F.R. 312.34 (2008) ("[A] drug may be made available for treatment use under
this section earlier than Phase 3, but ordinarily not earlier than Phase 2."). The media has covered
a few stories of patients other than Abigail Burroughs who have been denied treatment access to
investigational drugs. See, e.g., Kianna's Law, WALL ST. J., Nov. 15, 2005, at A22 (reporting on
the story of Kianna Karnes, a woman who died of kidney cancer and was unable to gain expanded
access to two investigational drugs).
160. DiMasi, Risks, supra note 34, at 303 fig.7. See also Kola & Landis, supra note 34, at
712 (finding only 5% of investigational cancer drugs are eventually approved).
161. DiMasi, Risks, supra note 34, at 304 fig.9.
162. Frank Burroughs has made a similar argument, claiming that Abigail Alliance has
never "pushed" for a drug that was "rejected by the FDA." Talk of the Nation: FDA Drug
Approval Comes Too Late for Many Patients (National Public Radio broadcast Jul. 30, 2007).
However, it is not clear that Abigail Alliance has only sought access to drugs that are eventually
approved. In the same interview, Mr. Burroughs also says that Abigail Alliance worked with
patients seeking Provenge and was disappointed when the FDA did not approve Provenge. Id.
See also FDAnews, Judge Dismisses Parts of Provenge Lawsuit Against FDA, Dec. 3, 2007,
http://fdanews.com/newsletter/articleissueld=I 1066&articleld= 101686 (last visited Jan. 2, 2009)
(noting that the FDA is currently being sued for its failure to approve Provenge).
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III. No FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO ACCESS INVESTIGATIONAL DRUGS:
ABIGAIL ALLIANCE V. VON ESCHENBACH
Against this background of existing expanded access options and some
uncertainty about their efficacy, Abigail Alliance first filed a Citizen Petition
with the FDA and then filed a lawsuit against the FDA, in an attempt to further
increase terminally ill patients' access to investigational drugs.
A. Citizen Petition
In 2003, Abigail Alliance submitted proposed new regulations to the
FDA, called "Tier 1 Initial Approval," that would create a system of different
levels of approval. 164 A drug that completed Phase 1 trials and was determined
to be safe enough for further study in humans, could receive "Tier 1 Initial
Approval," contingent on the sponsor diligently pursuing full approval. 16' The
sponsor would be permitted to market drugs approved at the Tier 1 level and to
sell those drugs for a profit. 166 The Tier 1 proposal did not explicitly address
access for patients suffering from an illness that is not the drug's indication,
the situation that Abigail Burroughs faced. The FDA declined to accept
Abigail Alliance's proposal because it "would upset the appropriate balance
that [the FDA is] seeking to maintain, by giving almost total weight to the goal
of early availability and giving little recognition to the importance of
marketing drugs with reasonable knowledge for patients and physicians of
their likely clinical benefit and their toxicity."' 167 Abigail Alliance next filed a
Citizen Petition, a way to formally ask the administrative agency to take
action, requesting that the proposed regulations be promulgated. The FDA did
not respond to the Citizen Petition. 168
B. Abigail Alliance v. von Esehenbach
Following its unsuccessful attempt to change FDA policy through
163. Cf Abigail Alliance website, supra note I (calling for reform of expanded access
programs, without asking FDA for data regarding bow the current programs function).
164. See Kovach, supra note 1.
165. See id.
166. Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. McClellan, 2004 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 29594, at *4 (D.D.C. Aug. 30, 2004). See also Citizen Petition of the Abigail
Alliance and the Washington Legal Foundation, http://abigail-alliance.org/WLFFDA.pdf (last
visited Jan. 3, 2009).
167. Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. von Eschenbach, 495
F.3d 695, 700 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (en banc) (quoting Letter from Peter J. Pitts, Associate
Commissioner for External Relations, Department of Health and Human Services, to Frank
Burroughs, President, Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs 3 (Apr. 25,
2003)), cert. denied 128 S. Ct. 1069 (2008).
168. Id.
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administrative means, Abigail Alliance filed a complaint seeking to enjoin the
FDA from preventing the sale of investigational drugs to terminally ill patients,
on the grounds that the FDA's restrictive policy violates terminally ill persons'
fundamental rights to privacy, liberty, and life. 6 9Specifically, Abigail Alliance
sought access for mentally competent, terminally ill patients to investigational
drugs that, during Phase 1 clinical trials, were shown to be sufficiently safe for
further study in humans. 170  The complaint further alleged that the FDA's
existing expanded access programs were inadequate because sponsors were
only able to charge patients the cost of the drugs and could not profit from the
sale of unapproved drugs. According to Abigail Alliance, this system does not
provide sufficient motivation for sponsors to participate in expanded access
programs. 1
7 1
In Washington v. Glucksberg, the Supreme Court articulated the analysis
courts use to determine whether a particular interest, like the one asserted by
Abigail Alliance, is a protected liberty interest. 172
First, we have regularly observed that the Due Process Clause specially
protects those fundamental rights and liberties, which are, objectively, deeply
rooted in this Nation's history and tradition, and implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty, such that neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were
sacrificed. Second, we have required in substantive-due-process cases a
careful description of the asserted fundamental liberty interest.
1 73
If a protected liberty interest exists under this test, a court must determine
whether the government action affecting that interest "is narrowly tailored to
serve a compelling government interest." '74  If no protected liberty interest
exists, the government action affecting the interest must only be "rationally
related to legitimate government interests. "175
Applying this test, the District Court dismissed Abigail Alliance's case for
failure to state a claim, finding that terminally ill patients' access to
investigational drugs was not a protected liberty interest, and the FDA policy
of restricting access to investigational new drugs was rationally related to
169. Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. von Eschenbach, 445
F.3d 470, 472 (D.C. Cir. 2006), vacated en banc, 495 F.3d 695 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
170. Id.
171. See Abigail Alliance, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29594, at *5.
172. 521 U.S. 702 (1997). In this case, respondents sought a declaration that Washington's
ban on physician-assisted suicide was unconstitutional, because it violated terminally ill patients'
substantive due process liberty interests to make the choice to die via physician-assisted suicide.
The Supreme Court upheld the ban as constitutional, finding no protected liberty interest in
physician-assisted suicide. Id at 782. The Supreme Court has also articulated a slightly different
test to determine whether a protected liberty interest existed, grounded in "personal dignity and
autonomy." Abigail Alliance, 445 F.3d at 476. However, since each of the decisions in the
Abigail Alliance litigation applied a Glucksberg analysis, this paper only discusses that analysis in
depth. See Abigail Alliance, 495 F.3d at 697; Abigail Alliance, 445 F.3d at 471; Abigail Alliance,
2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29594, at *26-27.
173. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720-21 (citations and internal quotations omitted).
174. Id. at 721.
175. Id. at 728.
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legitimate state interests, such as protecting vulnerable patients from fraudulent
cures. 76  A three-judge panel of the D.C. Circuit heard the appeal of the
District Court's decision. Relying on Glucksberg, the two-judge majority
found that the District Court erred in dismissing the case. 177 Judges Rogers
and Ginsburg held Abigail Alliance had asserted a protected liberty interest,
stating ". . . where there are no alternative government-approved treatment
options, a terminally ill, mentally competent adult patient's informed access to
potentially life-saving investigational new drugs determined by the FDA after
Phase I trials to be sufficiently safe for expanded human trials warrants
protection under the Due Process Clause.' ' 8 The majority distinguished this
case from Rutherford because laetrile had not been demonstrated to be safe in
any clinical trials at any level, whereas Abigail Alliance sought access to drugs
that had been determined to be safe enough for further study in humans.
179
Judge Griffith dissented, arguing that no constitutionally protected interest in
access to unapproved drugs exists and that balancing the uncertain risks and
benefits of science is "for good reason, the historical province of the
democratic branches."' 80 The D.C. Circuit remanded the case to the District
Court to determine whether the FDA's policy barring access to post-Phase 1
investigational drugs was narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government
interest. 18
On rehearing, the D.C. Circuit en banc vacated the panel's decision on an
eight to two vote, again applying the Glucksberg analysis. 182 First, the court
assumed that mentally competent, terminally ill patients' right to access post-
Phase 1 drugs, as described by Abigail Alliance, would satisfy the "careful
description" prong of the Glucksberg analysis. 83 The court next turned to the
question of whether the asserted right was "deeply rooted in this Nation's
history, legal traditions, and practices."' 4  The court rejected Abigail
Alliance's first argument - that the asserted right was deeply rooted in our
history - because the government historically did not interfere with the right of
176. See Abigail Alliance, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29594, at *25-36.
177. Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. von Eschenbach, 445
F.3d 470, 486 (D.C. Cir. 2006), vacated en bane, 495 F.3d 695 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 487 (Griffith, J., dissenting).
181. Id. at 486
182. Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. von Eschenbach, 495
F.3d 695, 697 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (en bane), cert. denied 128 S. Ct. 1069 (2008).
183. Id. at 702 (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997)). Although
the D.C. Circuit assumed that the asserted right met the careful description requirement so that it
could reach the history and tradition argument, the court expressed doubt that the right as
described by Abigail Alliance could ever be constitutionally required. See id. at 703 n.6. Abigail
Alliance asserted a right to access drugs only after an administrative determination that a drug is
safe for Phase 2 testing; the court found "it difficult to imagine how a right inextricably entangled
with the details of shifting administrative regulations could be 'deeply rooted in this Nations'
history and tradition and implicit in the concept of ordered liberty."' Id. at 703 (quoting
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721).
184. Id at 703.
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physicians to determine which drugs would be effective for their patients until
the Kefauver-Harris amendments to the FDCA in 1962.185 The court cited the
longstanding tradition of regulating drugs for safety, rather than effectiveness,
as evidence that the FDA's regulation of post-Phase 1 drugs was consistent
with U.S. history. 186 Additionally, the court noted that some regulation prior to
the 1962 amendments did in fact monitor drug effectiveness.'87 Finally, the
court concluded that even if effectiveness of drugs was not significantly
regulated prior to 1962, it would not be persuasive evidence of a deeply rooted
right to unfettered access because the technology and the nature of the
pharmaceutical industry have evolved significantly over history creating a need
for new regulatory schemes.'
88
The court also rejected Abigail Alliance's argument that this right to "self
preservation" was deeply rooted in common law doctrines of necessity,'
89
intentional interference with rescue, and the right to self-defense. 190 The court
dismissed the necessity doctrine argument because "Congress may limit or
even eliminate a necessity defense that might otherwise be available. That is
precisely what the FDCA has done."' 191 The court held that the interference
with rescue doctrine did not apply. In order to interfere with rescue, a person
must "intentionally [prevent] a third person from giving to another aid
necessary to his bodily security. '192 The aid that Abigail Alliance claimed the
FDA had prevented - access to post-Phase I investigational drugs - was, by
definition, not necessary because the drugs had not been shown to be safe or
effective. 193 Finally, the court rejected the right to self-defense as a ground for
a protected liberty interest "[b]ecause terminally ill patients cannot fairly be
characterized as using reasonable force to defend themselves when they take
unproven and possibly unsafe drugs ... ."194
After finding that Abigail Alliance had not asserted a protected liberty
interest, the court upheld the District Court's conclusion that the FDA
regulations were rationally related to a legitimate government interest. 95 The
majority concluded by noting that although the Constitution does not require
that terminally ill patients be given treatment access to post-Phase I drugs,




186. See id. at 703-06.
187. Id. at 706.
188. Id. at 706-07.
189. The necessity doctrine covers "the situation where physical forces beyond the actor's
control rendered illegal conduct the lesser of two evils." Id. at 707. The court noted that Abigail
Alliance does not explain in detail how this doctrine applies to its case. Id.
190. Id. at 707.
191. Id. at 708.
192. Id. at 708 (emphasis added).
193. Id. at 709 n. 15.
194. Id. at 710.
195. Id. at 712.
196. Id. Judge Griffith, who dissented in the panel decision, wrote the en banc majority
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The Supreme Court denied Abigail Alliance's petition for certiorari on
January 14, 2008.197 Several reasons may exist for the Supreme Court's
decision. Although the Court has not addressed the precise issue presented by
Abigail Alliance, it has rejected several similar constitutional challenges to the
FDCA.1 9 8 None of the circuit courts that have faced an issue similar to that
presented in Abigail Alliance, with the exception of the D.C. Circuit panel,
have found an affirmative right to access.199  Additionally, a nuanced,
technologically complex question, such as determining how much information
is enough to evaluate the safety of new drugs, may be better resolved by an
administrative agency that has the necessary expertise or by Congress that
possesses the institutional competence to balance different policy
considerations.200 Even if the Court had granted certiorari and reversed the
D.C. Circuit's decision, Abigail Alliance was not assured victory; in order to
accomplish its goal of access to post-Phase 1 investigational drugs, the
organization would have been required to demonstrate that the FDA
regulations, including the provisions for expanded access, were not narrowly
tailored to serve a compelling government interest.0 1
The en banc D.C. Circuit's decision only holds that there is no
constitutional right to expanded access. It does not hold that there is any
constitutional prohibition on such access, allowing room for expanding
treatment access to investigational drugs through policy channels, by either
regulatory or statutory changes.
IV. POLICY LEVEL PROPOSALS TO CHANGE THE EXPANDED ACCESS
OPTIONS
Following the onset of litigation, Abigail Alliance and the FDA each put
forth a proposal for change at the policy level that may achieve the Alliance's
goal of creating easier and broader access to investigational drugs.
A. ACCESS Act
With the support of Abigail Alliance, Senators Sam Brownback and
James Inhofe proposed the Access, Compassion, Care, and Ethics for Seriously
Ill Patients Act (ACCESS Act) in 2008.202 The Proposed ACCESS Act would
opinion. Judges Rogers and Ginsburg, who were the majority in the panel decision, dissented and
were the only two judges who were not in the en banc majority. See id. at 714 (Rogers, J.,
dissenting).
197. Id., cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 1069 (2008).
198. Id. at 710; United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 552 (1979). See also Gonzales
v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 28 (2005) (interpreting Rutherford as indicating that "the dispensing of new
drugs, even when doctors approve their use, must await federal approval").
199. Abigail Alliance, 495 F.3d at 710 n. 18.
200. See, e.g., Rebecca Dresser, Investigational Drugs and the Constitution, HASTINGS
CENTER REP., Nov.-Dec. 2006, at 9, 10; Jacobson & Parmet, supra note 1, at 207.
201. See Dresser, supra note 198, at 10.
202. The ACCESS Act was first proposed in 2005. Press Release, United States Senator
Sam Brownback, Brownback Introduces ACCESS Act (Nov. 3, 2005),
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amend the "fast track products" section of the FDCA to create a tiered system
of approval similar to the system proposed by Abigail Alliance's Citizen
Petition, and would alter other FDA practices, such as the use of statistical
evidence to evaluate whether a particular drug is safe and effective.20 3
1. Tiered Approval System
For "Compassionate Investigational" approval under the ACCESS Act, a
drug must show "preliminary evidence that the product may be effective
against a serious or life-threatening condition or disease" following Phase 1
trials, 20 4 and the sponsor must assure the FDA that it will continue clinical
investigation to try to obtain "Final Approval. '20 5  Compassionate
Investigational approval is "based upon multiple considerations that shall
include clinical evaluation and unmet patient needs. '20 6  The labels on
Compassionate Investigational drugs would inform consumers that they are for
patients who have exhausted all treatment options with Final Approval and
"unsuccessfully sought treatment, or obtained treatment that was not effective,
with an investigational drug, biological product, or device for which such
individual is a reasonable candidate." 20 7  It is not clear whether patients
diagnosed with an illness other than the desired drug's indication would be
eligible for access to Compassionate Investigational drugs under this scheme.
It is possible such patients would be eligible for access, similar to the way
patients currently can be prescribed any FDA-approved drug through the
practice of "off-label use. '2 8 Finally, all patients receiving Compassionate
Investigational drugs would be required to give written informed consent,
including consent for the sponsor or manufacturer to collect data about the
patient, and waive the right to sue the sponsor or manufacturer. 20 9
"Accelerated Approval" presumably follows Phase 2 clinical studies,
although the ACCESS Act does not make that explicit. Approval at the
http://brownback.senate.gov/pressapp/record.cfm?id=248248 (last visited Jan. 4, 2009). See also
Abigail-Alliance.org, Legislation: ACCESS Act, http://abigail-
alliance.org/S_3046_ACCESS_Act.pdf (last visited Jan. 4, 2009) (linking to the current ACCESS
Act).
203. See ACCESS Act, S.3046, 110th Cong. (2008).
204. Id. at § 3.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id. The language describing the second prong of the labeling requirement is not
entirely clear, but seems to imply that the patient must first seek access to the investigational drug
through clinical trials or expanded access programs, before purchasing the drug as a
Compassionate Investigational product.
208. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARDS, supra
note 136.
209. S.3046 § 3. This waiver may not be an enforceable contract. Generally, a
manufacturer of a defective or dangerous product is subject to tort liability, even if the purchaser
signed a contract waiving the right to sue. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS § 195(3).
A manufacturer may be more likely to be exempt from liability for the fairly negotiated sale of an
experimental product. See id.
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accelerated level requires only that the sponsor commit to pursuing Final
Approval, and there are "data and information that the drug... has an effect on
a clinical endpoint, or a surrogate endpoint, or biomarker that is reasonably
likely to predict clinical benefit to a patient."210 Accelerated Approval does
not include consent and waiver requirements like those required for
Compassionate Investigational Access. 211 Both Compassionate Investigational
and Accelerated products may be subject to expedited withdrawal if the
sponsor fails to conduct continuing clinical investigation, further investigation
does not demonstrate a clinical benefit of the drug, any other evidence suggests
the product is not safe or effective for the target population, or the sponsor
distributes false or misleading promotional materials about the product.212




The ACCESS Act also contains several changes to the FDCA that are
separate from the tiered approval system. To replace the current fast track
system, the ACCESS Act would create an Advisory Committee to facilitate
accelerated full approval of drugs intended to treat serious or life-threatening
illnesses. 214 The Committee would be comprised of eleven members, two of
whom must be "representatives of patient interests. ' 215 The Secretary of the
Department of Health and Human Services would be permitted to delegate
decision-making authority for a particular drug to the Committee.
21 6
The ACCESS Act would require that the FDA "establish a new program
to expand access to investigational treatments for individuals with serious or
life threatening conditions and diseases." 21 7 The FDA would be required to
promulgate written guidance that describes the new programs, encourages
submission of Compassionate Investigational and Accelerated applications,
and facilitates access to investigational drugs without undue delay.21 8 The
ACCESS Act aims to hasten the approval of investigational drugs by requiring
the FDA to develop surrogate endpoints and biomarkers for use in clinical
investigation, and to place equal weight on "clinical judgment and statistical
analysis in evaluation of the safety and effectiveness of drugs.
' 219
The ACCESS Act would mandate the publication of all investigational
drugs currently under study.220  This requirement does not represent a
210. S.3046 § 3.
211. See id.
212. See id.
213. See id. § 3(d).
214. Id. § 3(g).
215. Id.
216. Id. § 3(h).
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significant change to FDA practice. ClinicalTrials.gov already serves as a
publicly accessible registry of all clinical trials,221 and clinical trials of
investigational drugs targeted to serious illnesses are required to be published
under current law.
222
Finally, the ACCESS Act does not explicitly address whether
pharmaceutical companies could profit from the sale of Compassionate
Investigational drugs or investigational drugs in expanded access programs.
Perhaps, because Compassionate Investigational drugs would be "approved,"
pharmaceutical companies would be allowed to charge patients more than cost.
Additionally, the ACCESS Act would establish a five-year period during
which Medicare would cover Compassionate Investigational drugs, collect
information regarding the utilization rates of the drugs, and make
recommendations to Congress at the end of the five-year period regarding
continued coverage.
223
B. FDA Proposed Rule: Expanded Access to Investigational Drugs for
Treatment Use
After the now-vacated D.C. Circuit panel's opinion in Abigail Alliance,
the FDA issued a Proposed Rule that would modify its existing expanded
access programs.224 Although the Rule was not a major departure from the
status quo and has not yet been adopted, it does propose constructive changes
that would clarify the expanded access programs.225 The Proposed Rule would
amend the Code of Federal Regulations to create three types of expanded
access programs that differ based on the number of patients they are intended
to serve. The rule proposes three programs: one program for individual
patients, which would also cover emergency access; one for "intermediate-size
patient populations;" and one for larger patient populations that would be
analogous to the current treatment IND program. 226 In order to be eligible for
any of the programs, the patient must meet four criteria: (1) the patient must
have a serious or life-threatening disease; (2) there must be no satisfactory
treatment available other than the investigational drug; (3) the potential benefit
to the patient of using the investigational drug must outweigh the potential
health risks of using the drug; and (4) providing the expanded access must not
interfere with the clinical investigation. 227 The primary differences between
the proposed rule and the existing regulations are that the proposed rule
clarifies the different expanded access options and the costs that sponsors are
permitted to pass onto patients, and it creates an access option that would
221. ClinicalTrials.gov, supra note 152.
222. See Wadman, supra note 153, at 175.
223. See S.3046 § 5,
224. Expanded Access to Investigational Drugs for Treatment Use, 71 Fed. Reg. 75,147
(proposed Dec 14, 2006) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. § 312).
225. See id.
226. Id. at 75,150-5 1.
227. See id. at 75,150-52, 75,166-67.
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explicitly allow off-label expanded access.
1. Access for Individual Patients
For an individual patient to obtain an investigational drug for treatment
use outside of a clinical trial, the patient's physician must determine that the
benefit of using the investigational drug outweighs the risk for that particular
patient, and the patient must not be able to access the drug through a clinical
trial or other type of expanded access program.2 28 The Proposed Rule creates
several safeguards; it limits the treatment to "a single course of therapy for a
specified duration," and requires physicians to provide a written summary of
the patient's use, including a discussion of any unexpected adverse events,
when the treatment concludes.229  If a "significant number" of individual
patients submit applications for the same investigational drug, the FDA may
ask the sponsor to submit an application for an intermediate-size or treatment
access program. 230 This section also permits emergency use in a manner very
similar to the current emergency use regulation. 231 This proposed regulation
clarifies when and how individual patients may receive investigational drugs.
2. Intermediate-Size Patient Populations
The intermediate-size patient population program is the most innovative
part of the proposed rule. This program would allow expanded access to drugs
in three situations. First, patients may be allowed access if a drug is not being
developed through a full clinical investigation because the sponsor cannot
enroll enough participants in clinical trials due to rarity of a disease. 232
Second, patients who do not meet clinical trial enrollment criteria, for example,
because they have a disease or a stage of the disease other than the one being
studied, or are too sick, may gain access to drugs that are being developed fully
through all stages of clinical investigation.233 This prong is the only proposal
for change that would explicitly address off-label use of experimental drugs,
the situation that Abigail Burroughs faced. Third, patients may gain access to
drugs that have been taken off the market due to safety concerns 234 or a failure
to meet post-approval requirements. Additionally, patients may access drugs
with the same active ingredient as a drug that has been taken off the market or
228. Id. at 75,153, 75,167
229. Id. at 75,167.
230. Id.
231. Compare id.(allowing requests for expanded access via phone, facsimile, or other
means of electronic communication, "[i]f there is an emergency that requires the patient to be
treated before a written submission can be made"), with 21 C.F.R. § 312.36 (2007) (allowing
requests for expanded access "by telephone or other rapid communication means," when an
emergency "does not allow time for submission of an IND").
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is no longer on the market due to a shortage.
235
In addition to meeting one of these three criteria, data must suggest the
drug is safe enough to justify a clinical trial with the number of patients
expected to take the drug through expanded access, and there must be
preliminary evidence of its effectiveness.236 The application must include this
data and inform the FDA whether the drug is being actively developed (or, if it
is not being developed, why not) and why the patients cannot access the drug
through traditional clinical trials.237  Finally, the proposed rule provides
safeguards of both FDA and sponsor oversight.
238
3. Treatment IND or Treatment Protocol
For large groups of patients, the Proposed Rule creates an expanded
access program that is almost identical to the existing treatment IND
program. 239 The differences between the two programs are not significant.
4. Permissible Charges
The FDA's Proposed Rule does not permit pharmaceutical companies to
profit from expanded access programs; it allows sponsors and manufacturers to
recover only the direct costs of producing the drug and the costs associated
with monitoring the expanded access protocol and meeting the expanded
access requirements. 240  The Proposed Rule maintains most of the previous
charging regulations, expanding those charging policies to cover all three new
expanded option programs. 24' Additionally, it clarifies the definition of
recoverable direct and indirect costs by providing examples of recoverable
costs, such as the cost of raw materials to produce the drug.242
235. 71 Fed. Reg. at 75,154, 75,167.
236. Id. at 75,167-68.
237. Id.
238. See id. at 75,168.
239. Compare id. at 75,168 (allowing treatment access when (1) patients have a serious or
life-threatening condition, (2) the potential benefits of the drug justify the potential risks, (3)
expanded access will not interfere with clinical trials, (4) the drug is under investigation in a
clinical trial or clinical trials have been completed, and (5) the sponsor is pursuing full approval),
with 21 C.F.R. § 312.34 (2007) (allowing treatment access when (1) patients have a serious or
life-threatening condition, (2) the patient has no other satisfactory alternative, (3) the drug is
under investigation in a clinical trial or clinical trials have been completed, and (4) the sponsor is
pursuing full approval), and 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb(c)(5) (2008) (adding to the regulations that
treatment access must not interfere with clinical trials).
240. Charging for Investigational Drugs, 71 Fed. Reg. 75,168, 75,172-73 (proposed Dec.
14, 2006) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. § 312).
241. See id. at 75,169-70.
242. See id. at 75,172-73.
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V. POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF CHANGING THE EXPANDED ACCESS
PROGRAMS
Proposed changes to the expanded access mechanisms raise a variety of
policy concerns. In order to evaluate whether the FDA should change its
expanded access options to one of the systems proposed by the ACCESS Act
and the FDA or to a system not yet conceived, this Part examines the policy
concerns raised by expanded access programs generally and those that would
allow post-Phase I and off-label access to investigational drugs.
A. Comprehensive Data
Without clear and comprehensive data regarding how many patients are
informed of expanded access programs through the current system, how many
patients try and fail to gain access to investigational drugs and why they fail,
and how safe and effective the investigational drugs sought for access
ultimately are, it is difficult to determine what changes, beyond clarification of
the regulations, should be made. 243 If the FDA collected data about the
functioning of the system and made it publicly available, stakeholders-
including pharmaceutical companies, physicians, patients, and patient
advocacy groups-may be better able to assess the system. Such transparency
might also encourage patients and patient advocacy groups to have greater trust
in the FDA.244 Of course, many patient advocacy groups might simply
disagree with the FDA about whether patients have a right to post-Phase 1 and
off-label access to investigational drugs. Information is not likely to bridge
such wide gaps in opinion, but it will improve assessment of each side's
arguments.
B. Safety and Expanded Access
One policy concern raised by expanded access programs is whether they
strike the appropriate balance between ensuring the safety of approved drugs
and increasing access to unapproved drugs.245 Over the past few years, in
addition to calls for reform of the FDA's expanded access programs, the FDA
has been criticized for not adequately ensuring the safety of the products that
are approved.246 In one high profile example of such criticism, the FDA
approved the painkiller Vioxx without requiring additional clinical trials,
despite knowing that Vioxx might pose significant cardiac risks.247 Patients
243. Canada is currently collecting such data to evaluate its Special Access Programme. See
SAP - Comprehensive Review, supra note 143.
244. See, e.g., Bruce M. Psaty & R. Alta Charo, FDA Responds to Institute of Medicine
Drug Safety Recommendations -In Part, 297 J. AM. MED. Ass'N 1917, 1919 (2007).
245. See, e.g., Jacobson & Parmet, supra note 1, at 206-07.
246. See, e.g., FUTURE OF DRUG SAFETY, supra note 34; Sheila Weiss Smith, Sidelining
Safety - The FDA's Inadequate Response to the IOM, 357 NEW ENG. J. MED. 960, 960 (2007);
Marian Burros, F.D.A. Inspections Lax, Congress is Told, N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 2007, at C3.
247. See FUTURE OF DRUG SAFETY, supra note 34, at 65; Charles Steenburg, The Food and
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taking Vioxx were later found to have five times as many heart attacks as the
patients taking a traditional painkiller had.248 Safety concerns are cited as the
reason for attrition in twenty to thirty percent of the drugs that drop out of the
clinical investigation process.249  Approximately thirty to forty percent of
failed investigational drugs drop out due to a lack of effectiveness.2 5 0 Risks of
using investigational drugs include a lack of effectiveness, as well as safety
risks such as hastening death or an increase in the pain and suffering
experienced by the patient.251 The high attrition rate of post-Phase 1 drugs
suggests that allowing access to such drugs poses a significant possibility of
increased risks to patients. 25 2  This risk of adverse effects also may be
particularly high when patients obtain off-label access to investigational drugs
because there would be little or no actual data about the drug's effect on their
condition or adverse events in their patient population. 253 From an ethical
perspective, such an increase in risk might not be justifiable because the
benefits to the patients are unknown and may be unlikely.
C. Interference with the Approval Process
Expanded access programs have the potential to interfere with clinical
trials by reducing the number of patients who enroll in traditional clinical trials
and creating additional opportunity for adverse events to occur. If an
investigational drug is available through expanded access, patients may be
reluctant to enroll in clinical trials, where they risk receiving the control rather
than the investigational drug, when they could gain certain access to the
investigational drug outside of clinical trials. 254  Physicians also might
encourage feel pressure to help their patients seek expanded access instead of
enrolling in clinical trials.255 In the early 1990s, many researchers felt that
expanded access significantly decreased enrollment in the clinical trials of
didanosine, a drug that treats HIV/AIDS 6  Sponsors' concerns regarding
Drug Administration's Use of Postmarketing (Phase IV) Study Requirements: Exception to the
Rule?, 61 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 295, 375 (2006).
248. Steenburg, supra note 245, at 376.
249. DiMasi, Risks, supra note 34, at 304 fig.9 (finding 20% attrition); Kola & Landis,
supra note 34, at 712 (finding 30% attrition).
250. DiMasi, Risks, supra note 34, at 304 fig.9 (finding 40%); Kola & Landis, supra note
34, at 712 (finding 30%).
251. Arthur Caplan, Is It Sound Public Policy to Let the Terminally Ill Access Experimental
Medical Innovations?, AM. J. BIOETHICS, June 2007, at 1, 3.
252. See DiMasi, Risks, supra note 34, at 303 fig.7; Kola & Landis, supra note 34, at 712.
253. This argument may be the one of the reasons that the European Union recommends
that its member states prohibit off-label access to experimental drugs. See EMEA, GUIDELINE ON
COMPASSIONATE Use, supra note 146.
254. See Shira Bender et al., Access for the Terminally Ill to Experimental Medical
Innovations: A Three-Pronged Threat, AM. J. BIOETHICS, Oct. 2007, at 3, 4; Editorial, A Delicate
Balancing Act, 6 NATURE REV. DRUG DISCOVERY 685, 685 (2007).
255. See Groopman, supra note 9, at 43 (describing how the author, a physician, "got swept
up in the campaign to distribute experimental drugs" during the early AIDS epidemic).
256. EVE NICHOLS, INST. OF MED. EXPANDING ACCESS TO INVESTIGATIONAL THERAPIES
FOR HIV INFECTIONS AND AIDS 32 (1991).
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enrollment may be particularly strong if the FDA allowed expanded access at
the post-Phase 1 stage, because such access might affect Phase 2 as well as
Phase 3 trials.25 7 The current FDA treatment use program, as well as the
programs proposed in the FDA's Proposed Rule and the ACCESS Act, require
patients to exhaust clinical trial options before gaining expanded access. If
such requirements have been effective in preventing expanded access
mechanisms from interfering with clinical trial enrollment, the FDA may want
to publicize that success to assure sponsors that expanded access does not
threaten enrollment in their clinical trials.
Pharmaceutical companies also have expressed reluctance to make an
investigational drug available through expanded access because of their
concern that an adverse event in the expanded access protocol would prevent
their drug from receiving approval. 258 The director of the Office of Oncology
Drug Products stated that many companies are afraid "the FDA will find some
toxicity in the expanded-access program ... and the drug will be killed. 25 9
None of the proposed changes to the current expanded access mechanisms
address this concern.2 60  Similar to enrollment concerns, fears regarding
adverse events may be heightened by the prospect of post-Phase 1 and off-
label expanded access because such access would enlarge the pool of patients
who can access investigational drugs, creating more opportunities for adverse
events to occur. The FDA cannot ignore evidence of toxicity discovered in
expanded access protocols, but it is not clear whether adverse events in
expanded access programs have prevented any products from receiving
approval. By working with the pharmaceutical industry, the FDA may be able
to develop modified access regulations that address this fear while still
protecting patient safety. For example, the FDA may determine it is
scientifically justified to weigh adverse events not involving severe toxicity
that occur in patients with an illness other than the target condition differently
than adverse events in the target population. However, these issues are
particularly difficult because workable solutions may depend on whether the
FDA would be scientifically justified in weighing adverse events differently
when the drug is used in a non-target population.
Expanded access programs' potential to interfere with the clinical trials
process has implications beyond pharmaceutical companies' willingness to
participate in them. Interference with clinical trials could negatively impact
public health by preventing potentially effective treatments from reaching the
market.261 The Food and Drug Modernization Act of 1997 and the FDA's
Proposed Rule wisely include provisions allowing the FDA to reject expanded
257. Allowing patients off-label access to an investigational drug likely does not pose
clinical trial enrollment problems because such patients do not have the condition that would
allow them to enroll in the clinical trials.
258. See Bethan Hughes, Resolving the Access Dilemma, 6 NATURE REV. DRUG
DISCOVERY 769, 770 (2007); Groopman, supra note 9, at 45.
259. Groopman, supra note 9, at 45.
260. See Hughes, supra note 256, at 770.
261. See Bender et al., supra note 252, at 4.
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access applications if the access would interfere with the clinical
investigation.262 These provisions balance the tension between the private
desire to make choices about one's own health care and the public health
benefit of knowing the risks and benefits of drugs on the market that is
inherent to the drug regulation system.
D. Sponsors' Costs
Pharmaceutical companies may be concerned about the cost of
participating in expanded access programs, because they cannot profit from
investigational drugs, and they incur administrative costs related to running the
expanded access protocol. Such concerns may be heightened if the FDA
increases the size of the expanded access patient pool through extending
expanded access programs to include post-Phase 1 drugs and off-label access.
The FDA's Proposed Rule stipulates that pharmaceutical companies can
charge patients for both the costs of producing the investigational drug for
treatment use and the administrative costs of overseeing the treatment use
program.2 63 The pharmaceutical industry has found this clarification of the
FDA's charging policies beneficial.264 The ACCESS Act goes further,
allowing companies to market and sell their "Tier 1" drugs, without requiring
that it be sold without profit.
2 65
Both of these proposed changes to the system attempt to alleviate some of
the financial burdens associated with sponsors' participation in expanded
access programs. However, even if the pharmaceutical companies were
permitted to market investigational drugs under the ACCESS Act provisions,
they would probably not be able to entirely offset their costs. 266  Drug
manufacturers probably could not charge full market price for post-Phase 1
drugs.267 The expanded access market is small because expanded access is
only available to those terminally ill patients who have exhausted all approved
treatments and are unable to enroll in clinical trials. 268 Medicare, Medicaid,
and private insurance companies do not pay for investigational drugs.
269
Additionally, the costs of investing in production capability are high;
pharmaceutical companies are not likely to invest in large-scale production
with little certainty that post-Phase 1 drugs will ever receive full approval and
262. See 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb(b)(3) (2008); Expanded Access to Investigational Drugs for
Treatment Use, 71 Fed. Reg. 75,147, 75,150-52, 75,166-67 (proposed Dec 14, 2006) (to be
codified at 21 C.F.R. § 312). The tiered approval systems proposed by the ACCESS Act and
Abigail Alliance do not include such a provision. See ACCESS Act, S. 1956 109th Cong. (2005);
Kovach, supra note 1, at 25.
263. Charging for Investigational Drugs, 71 Fed. Reg. 75,168, 75,172-73 (proposed Dec.
14, 2006) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. § 312).
264. See Hughes, supra note 258, at 770.
265. See S. 1956.
266. See Okie, supra note 4, at 440.
267. See id.
268. Currie, supra note 129, at 321-23.
269. Groopman, supra note 9, at 45.
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the concomitant access to a large market.
270
Allowing pharmaceutical companies to profit from the expanded access
programs may not only fail to relieve the financial burdens, it may also
increase public distrust of the pharmaceutical companies. Public opinion of
pharmaceutical companies is not positive. 271 Many people already believe that
pharmaceutical companies care more about their profits than about patients'
health; allowing pharmaceutical companies to profit from the sale of
investigational drugs, not proven to be safe or effective, to vulnerable,
terminally ill patients may exacerbate the negative public image of the
pharmaceutical industry.272 The FDA's pricing scheme seems to better balance
the need to encourage pharmaceutical companies to participate in expanded
access programs, while maintaining public trust in the approval process. The
lack of certain financial incentives, as well as the potential for interference
with the clinical trial system, suggests that pharmaceutical companies may not
be eager to participate in and may not benefit from a post-Phase 1 market that
the ACCESS Act would create. 273 If expanded access programs become more
widely available or required, pharmaceutical companies may have to adjust the
pricing of drugs that are eventually approved to account for the costs of
expanded access programs.
E. Patients' Costs
The current regulations, the FDA Proposed Rule, and the ACCESS Act
only allow access to investigational drugs for those patients who can afford to
purchase the drugs. Private health insurance, Medicare, and Medicaid have not
paid for treatment access to investigational drugs in the past and probably will
not pay for such access in the future. 274  Even if patients are only being
charged for the cost of the drugs, that cost could be unaffordable for many low-
income persons.275  All expanded access programs, but particularly those
programs that would increase the cost of the drugs by allowing pharmaceutical
270. Currie, supra note 130, at 321-23. For example, one of the drugs that Abigail
Burroughs sought to access outside of clinical trials, gefitinib, was easier and cheaper to
manufacture than the other drug, cetuximab. Even though both drugs were EGFR inhibitors
intended for similar patient populations, only gefitinib was ever widely distributed through an
expanded access program. See Editorial, A Delicate Balancing Act, supra note 254, at 685.
271. See Kaiser Family Foundation, Health Poll Report: Views of Pharmaceutical
Companies, Feb. 2005, http://www.kff.org/healthpollreport/feb_2005/5.cfm (last visited Jan. 4,
2009).
272. Kaiser Family Foundation, Health Poll Report, Pharmaceutical Companies' Role in
Society, Feb. 2005, http://www.kff.org/healthpollreport/feb_2005/6.cfm (last visited Jan. 4,
2009).
273. See Currie, supra note 130, at 323.
274. See Groopman, supra note 9, at 45.
275. The cost of developing a new drug was estimated to be eight hundred and two million
dollars in 2001. Dimasi et al, Price ofInnovation, supra note 30, at 167 fig.2. Even if the cost of
producing drugs for and administering a treatment program is a very small fraction of the overall
cost of a developing a drug, drugs made available through treatment programs are not likely to be
affordable for most low-income persons.
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companies to sell the drugs for a profit, create the possibility that cutting-edge
therapies will be available only to wealthy, terminally ill persons. Low-income
persons would still have the opportunity to access investigational drugs
through clinical trials, but they would face the risk of receiving the current
treatment rather than the desired investigational drug. Given the low approval
success rates of post-Phase 1 drugs, low-income persons would not necessarily
have access to worse care than high-income persons; but a system that
provides low-income persons with more limited choices than it provides to
high-income persons raises concerns about further exacerbating inequality in
health care options and implicating the FDA and the researchers in the unequal
distribution of resources.276 There is no clear, feasible solution to this problem
within our current tiered health care financing system.
F. Communicating the Risks and Benefits of Investigational Drugs
Expanded access programs pose a challenge to the scientific community
regarding how best to communicate the limited knowledge about the risks and
the benefits of investigational drugs. Programs that provide post-Phase 1 and
off-label access to investigational drugs present the greatest challenges,
because there is very limited knowledge about the risks and the benefits of
such access to investigational drugs for a particular patient.
On an individual level, the informed consent process is the mechanism
through which patients learn about the risks and the benefits.2 77 In a treatment
use setting, when patients are using investigational drugs, not as study
participants but for treatment, the risk of therapeutic misconception may be
particularly high. 78 Even when patients are told they are participating in a
research study that is not intended to benefit them personally in any way,
patients tend to exhibit a robust therapeutic misconception. 279 In order to make
every effort to ensure patients understand the uncertain nature of
investigational drugs, physicians administering investigational drugs for
treatment use should be careful to employ the most effective means of
informing patients possible.2 80  Such methods may include providing the
relevant information more than once, testing patient comprehension of the
276. Cf Benjamin J. Krohmal & Ezekiel J. Emanuel, Access and Ability to Pay: The Ethics
of a Tiered Health Care System, 167 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 433, 434 (2007) (describing
some of the ethical objections to a tiered health care system, and responses to those objections).
277. See Talbott, supra note 92, at 318.
278. Cf Caplan, supra note 249, at 2 ("Nor is it clear that those who are terminally ill can
make the requisite autonomous risk/benefit decision to use a new drug, device or vaccine.").
279. See id. at 2; Charles W. Lidz & Paul S. Appelbaum, The Therapeutic Misconception:
Problems and Solutions, 40 MED. CARE (SEPT. SUPP.) V-55, V-57 (2002); see also Steven Joffe
et al., Quality of Informed Consent in Cancer Clinical Trials: A Cross-Sectional Survey, 358
LANCET 1772, 1775 tbl.2 (2001) (finding almost half of participants in cancer clinical trials
mistakenly thought the experimental treatment was the standard treatment for their type of cancer,
and almost 30% believed that the experimental treatment was "proven" to be the best treatment
for their type of cancer).
280. See Talbott, supra note 92, at 318.
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pertinent information, and using a physician who is unaffiliated with the
development of the drug to help explain the risks and benefits. 28' Sponsors
also should be required to disclose all known safety and effectiveness
information to the physicians administering the investigational drug, even if
such information is proprietary. 282  None of the proposed changes to the
expanded access programs explicitly require these extensive informed consent
procedures.
Expanded access programs also raise large-scale questions about how
science should be advertised and how the public should be informed of the
risks and benefits of investigational drugs. Under the current expanded access
programs, it is unclear exactly how most patients are informed of the
opportunity to gain early treatment access to investigational drugs. Many
patients likely learn about investigational drugs through their physicians,
through patient advocacy groups like Abigail Alliance, or through clinical trial
listings on registries, such as ClinicalTrials.gov. Under the ACCESS Act,
pharmaceutical companies would be permitted to conduct limited marketing
campaigns for post-Phase 1 drugs. The FDA would have to determine how
best to regulate such marketing to ensure that it adequately informed
consumers of the uncertainty regarding the safety and effectiveness of such
drugs. Apart from marketing under the ACCESS Act, the FDA,
pharmaceutical companies, or other stakeholders may want to consider how to
best inform patients of expanded access opportunities and the uncertainty
inherent to them.
G. Physician and Sponsor Liability
Allowing patients post-Phase I and off-label expanded access to
investigational drugs may create increased risks of malpractice liability for the
physicians who oversee a patient's expanded access use and tort liability for
drug manufacturers.2 83 Physicians may face traditional malpractice liability for
recommending an expanded access protocol to a patient that does not prove
successful.284  Under expanded access protocols, physicians also have
oversight responsibilities in addition to their traditional duties as a physician,
such as reporting adverse events to the sponsors, and may face liability for
failing to perform these duties.285 Similarly, sponsors may face traditional tort
liability if adverse events occur or if they decline to permit expanded access to
281. See NAT'L BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMM'N, ETHICAL AND POLICY ISSUES IN
RESEARCH
INVOLVING HUMAN PARTICIPANTS, VOL. 11 (2001); Daniel W. Fitzgerald et al., Comprehension
During Informed Consent in a Less-Developed Country, 360 LANCET 1301, 1302 (2002); Talbott,
supra note 92, at 318; Cynthia Woodsong & Quarraisha Abdool Karim, A Model Designed to
Enhance Informed Consent: The HIV Prevention Trials Network, 95 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 412,
415 (2005).
282. See Jacobson & Parmet, supra note 1, at 206.
283. See Talbott, supra note 92, at 317-18.
284. See id. at 317.
285. See id.
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a product.286 This possibility of increased liability may be a disincentive for
physicians and sponsors to participate in expanded access programs,
particularly for post-Phase 1 drugs, which are less likely to be safe and
effective than more developed drugs.
The ACCESS Act attempts to safeguard physicians and drug
manufacturers from this increased possibility of liability through a waiver.
Unless enacted through legislation such as the ACCESS Act, such a waiver
might be invalid as an unenforceable contract contrary to public policy.
2 87
Typically, two parties cannot contractually relieve one party of all tort liability
for its actions.288 Furthermore, some have suggested the research community
may not want to be involved with asking patients to relinquish their right to
sue.289 However, a situation in which a competent adult has knowingly chosen
to use an experimental product may be one situation in which a waiver of
liability is not against public policy.290  If the FDA wishes to encourage
sponsors and physicians to participate in expanded access programs, it will
need to address their liability concerns.
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS
Of the existing formal proposals for change, the FDA's Proposed Rule
best balances the policy problems raised by expanded access programs. The
Proposed Rule clarifies the expanded access programs, for example, by making
explicit the currently implicit individual use program. It maintains the current
balance between ensuring product safety and allowing terminally ill patients
access to investigational drugs, which seems appropriate without data
suggesting patients are routinely denied safe and effective investigational
drugs. The Proposed Rule also strikes a balance between providing access and
preventing disruption of the clinical trial process through its explicit provision
prohibiting access that interferes with clinical trials. It explicitly addresses the
needs of terminally ill patients who are excluded from clinical trials because,
like Abigail Burroughs, their disease is not the exact condition being studied.
The Rule does not grant the broad post-Phase 1 access that Abigail Alliance
seeks, but such access may not be an appropriate balance of safety and risks.
Finally, the Proposed Rule is supported by a variety of stakeholders, including
pharmaceutical companies, professional medical organizations, and patient
advocacy groups.2
91
Beyond the Proposed Rule, the FDA should consider developing better
286. Seeid. at318.
287. See ACCESS Act, S. 1956 109th Cong. (2005); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS
§ 195(3) (1981). Explicit legislation may be the only means to override a public policy argument,
assuming that the courts found that a waiver of liability in this circumstance is against public
policy.
288. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS § 195(3).
289. See Talbott, supra note 92, at 318.
290. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS § 195(3).
291. See Bristol, supra note 150, at 816. Abigail Alliance is not one of the patient advocacy
groups that support the Proposed Rule. See id.
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mechanisms for communicating about expanded access options with the
public. First, similar to the Special Access Programme in Canada, 292 the FDA
could collect and disseminate to the relevant stakeholders information about
how well the expanded access programs work in order to promote transparency
and trust. Second, FDA may be able to encourage the National Institutes of
Health and the Department of Health and Human Services to continue to
improve the clinical trials registry to make it both more comprehensive and
user-friendly, as well as consider other means for effectively communicating
the availability of expanded access programs to patients. Third, the FDA could
consider studying how best to communicate with the public at large about the
risks and benefits of investigational drugs. Fourth, the FDA could expand its
informed consent requirements. It could include an explicit requirement that
the physicians conducting informed consent be given all available safety
information about the investigational drug, even if that information is
proprietary. The FDA also may want to encourage physicians and researchers
to use an informed consent process that is more rigorous than the traditional
process, particularly if the unapproved drug is at a relatively early stage in the
clinical investigation process. A rigorous informed consent process may be a
way both to alleviate sponsors' and physicians' concerns about liability,
because it may provide some protection from liability and ensure that ethical
obligations to adequately educate patients are met.293 Fifth, the FDA may want
to consider ways in which it can gather and disseminate information to the
drug sponsors regarding the functioning of the expanded access programs. For
example, if the FDA has evidence that participation in expanded access
programs does not significantly increase the risk that a drug will not be
approved due to increased incidence of adverse events, communicating such
information to sponsors may mitigate their concerns.
The FDA should also consider ways in which it can mitigate some of the
other disadvantages of expanded access programs. The financial costs that
sponsors face in such programs are a particularly intractable problem; the FDA
cannot create a viable market for the sponsors without drastically altering the
approval process, nor can the FDA reduce a sponsor's production costs. The
FDA may be able to mitigate some of the other disincentives perceived by
sponsors and physicians, such as decreasing the risk of tort liability through
requiring a rigorous informed consent process. Implementing many, if not all,
of these recommendations may be contingent on the financial and personnel
resources of the FDA.
VII. CONCLUSION
Although the courts have found no constitutional right to post-Phase 1
access of investigational drugs, expanded access programs can serve a valuable
function of giving terminally ill patients the opportunity to determine their own
292. See SAP - Comprehensive Review, supra note 143.
293. See Talbott, supra note 92, at 318.
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health care plan and maintain hope. Expanded access programs, in particular
those that would grant post-Phase 1 access and off-label use access, also pose
questions regarding how best to balance a myriad of policy and ethical
concerns. The recommendations put forth in this Note aim to strike the
appropriate balance between some of these concerns.
